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“Federal states distinguish between ordinary political action, which takes
place within the existing framework of political institutions, and political action which changes that very framework.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has historically delegated its procedural rulemaking authority to the courts.2 As a result, part of federal judges’ responsibili© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Carrie Leonetti is an Assistant Professor at the University of Oregon School of
Law. She wishes to thank Robert Rainwater for his inspiration and Carl Bjerre
for his thoughtful insights and encouragement, without either of which she never
would have ventured to write this Article.
1. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 259 (1986).
2. While Congress has the power to regulate federal practice and procedure, it can
exercise that power by delegating it to the courts in the same way that it delegates its power to create other laws to executive branch agencies. Compare
Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941) (upholding the courts’ power to adopt rules of procedure), with United
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ties is to adopt internal administrative rules for the effective
functioning of their courts. This delegation doctrine, however, says
nothing about the allocation of rulemaking authority with reference to
exercise of the delegation, particularly with reference to rule content.
As a result, much has been written on the constitutionally permissible
scope of this judicial rulemaking.
Much of this scholarly literature deals with either which entity
(Congress or the courts) should have ultimate control over judicial
practice and procedure3 or how far courts may go in exercising nonStates v. Grimaud, 220 US 506, 514–16 (1911), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 US
22, 36–37 (1932) (upholding administrative agencies’ authority to exercise power
delegated by Congress).
3. See FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF
THE JUDICIARY 19 (1994) (citing a number of scholarly articles discussing the inter-branch conflict over the rulemaking power); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 (2d ed. 1987); Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1285 (1994); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 909 (1999) (arguing that judicial rulemaking is legitimate because deliberation is more important than public participation); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, REA] (“Nothing
could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act than that
the procedure/substance dichotomy in the first two sentences was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.”); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 201–29 (2001) (arguing that Congress has limited power to regulate
federal court procedure); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative
Control over Judicial Rule Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1958); Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility
Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167,
192–93 (1979); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1043 (1993) (noting
that “commentators have placed recent emphasis on the relationship between
Congress and the Court in the rulemaking process as the source of the restriction
against affecting substantive rights”); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 376 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]; Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking:
The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283
(1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking] (arguing that the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) unconstitutionally usurped judicial
branch authority by delegating rulemaking authority to local advisory committees and by “declaring procedural rules to be substantive law”); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1582–94 (2000) (arguing
that Congress has broad power to regulate federal court procedure); Roscoe
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926) (insisting that “procedure . . . belongs to the courts rather than to the legislature”);
Martin H. Redish & Umu M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, The Rules Enabling
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Im-
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traditional court functions, such as budgeting, under the doctrine of
inherent powers.4 Challenges to court-made rules typically have
posed the question whether the judiciary, in promulgating a particular rule, has violated the Rules Enabling Act (REA).5 On the topic of
how much of practice and procedure may be considered to be within
the inherent powers of the courts, there is a lack of uniformity and
consistency in federal-court decisions, as well as a lack of literature
that is national in scope.6
“[J]udicial interpretations dealing with the separation of powers
and rulemaking provision are extremely varied.”7 “[T]here is a dearth
of controlling authority or guidance at the federal level.”8 As Felix
Stumpf has explained, despite the extensive exercise of putative inherent rulemaking powers by courts, “learned writers have described
the concept as ‘shadowy’ and ‘nebulous,’ or as ‘a problem of definition
that has eluded or bedeviled many courts and commentators for
years.’”9

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

plications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1307–08, 1326 (2006) (arguing that current
rulemaking oversteps constitutional bounds because the committee produces substantive rules and proposing that rules falling into a “non-housekeeping” category of procedural rules or that “are found to implicate significant economic,
social, or political dispute[s]” should require congressional and presidential approval); John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928) (asserting that rulemaking power belonged to the Court alone); Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 229 (1998) (arguing that judicial rulemaking
threatens both judicial independence and judicial accountability because a judicially dominated rulemaking process is more likely to produce rules that either
are faulty or are perceived to be so).
Appropriation of sufficient resources to operate the courts is one area that has
received much attention. See STUMPF, supra note 3, at 47–60, and cases cited
therein; see, e.g., Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent
Power, 78 JUDICATURE 12 (1994); Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993);
Ted Z. Robertson & Christa Brown, The Judiciary’s Inherent Power to Compel
Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 864
(1988). See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND
POSSIBILITIES (1981) (discussing criticism that the Court has interpreted its
rulemaking authority too broadly).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking,
supra note 3, at 1288.
See James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an Independent Judiciary,
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 519 (2002). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure,
Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1682
(2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure, Politics] (questioning how “a power to
promulgate prospective, legislation-like rules can be squared with the grant of
judicial power in Article III”).
Wolf, supra note 6, at 520.
Id.
STUMPF, supra note 3, at 1.
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A discussion of who decides these questions and how is almost entirely absent from the scholarly literature. The scholarly literature
that does address even part of these subjects focuses on the promulgation of the nationwide Federal Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure, and
Criminal Procedure through the committee process that ultimately results in Supreme Court approval and presentment to Congress, not
the local rules and general orders that are promulgated far less formally and vary between and among districts.10 It is this morass into
which this Article attempts to hurl itself.
Judicial rulemaking invokes many of the same concerns as administrative rulemaking. Article I was structured to discourage factional
legislation.11 The framers specifically designed the legislative process
to include safeguards against factions, safeguards that judicial
rulemaking lacks.12 These safeguards protect not just community
10. Local rules enacted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 came under
scrutiny when the “Local Rules Project,” see infra note 47, discovered approximately 800 local rules inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
use in federal courts around the country. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules,
Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2023 (1989). To the extent that the scholarly
literature addresses local rulemaking, it is usually in the context of local rules
that conflict with federal ones, not the appropriateness of judicial rulemaking on
the subject of the particular rules in question. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, Fractured
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994).
11. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 247–49 (1986)
(concluding that the Constitution was designed to impede interest groups from
obtaining partisan advantage through political means).
12. See David Schoenbrod, Commentary: Separation of Powers and the Powers That
Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355,
372 (1987) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers]. The framers involved
a Senate, a House, and the President in the legislative process as a check on
factions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (arguing that the Senate is an additional guard against ill-advised legislation); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (describing the purpose of the presidential veto as a guard against factions). Defeat or inaction in any of these three different institutions would ordinarily stymie the faction. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra, at 372.
The exception is, of course, that presidential opposition can be overcome by
supermajorities in the House and Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. That each is
elected for different tenures based upon different apportionments of voting power
would make it harder for parochial interests to succeed in all three institutions.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing the number of senators and the duration of their tenure as a
disincentive to factions); see also Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 218–20 (1984) (arguing that the structure of congressional decision-making and the presidential veto promote the
stability of legislation and reduce the influence of factions). The framers vision
was that the time elapsed in stalemate would allow for the public to learn of the
issues at hand, thereby producing more mature and educated decisions. See H.
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195–96 (1972) (discussing Madison’s
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welfare, but also important constitutional values: electoral accountability and protection of the rights of those who are regulated (those
whose liberty and property are affected by court rules).13 Fundamentally, legislators, unlike federal judges, are accountable because their
continuance in office depends upon reelection.14
In comparison, judicial rulemaking vests the power in one institution. It radically reduces the number of individuals involved in adopting procedural rules; none of those individuals (under Article III) are
elected or accountable to elected officials for their decisions, and all of
them are life tenured,15 dramatically undercutting accountability.16

13.
14.

15.
16.

belief that the political process would allow the community to prevail over selfish
factional interests). The idea was that representatives would return home to explain to their constituents how parochial desires could not be achieved, bringing
maturation. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra, at 373. The framers
believed that a republic with legislative bodies large enough to include representatives from many factions would hinder factions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at
81–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the advantages of
large republics in guarding against factions); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 325
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (concluding that the variety of interests embraced by the American republic would discourage oppression by factious majorities); THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 341–44 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (concluding that the size of the Senate and House would help
to prevent the tyranny of a minority); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 383 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that requiring the concurrence of a
select and stable body would promote accountability for long-term consequences).
The idea was that bringing many different factions together in one process would
increase the chance that factions would frustrate each other. See Schoenbrod,
Separation of Powers, supra, at 373–74. In sum, “Madisonian republicanism was
intended, in part, to make a virtue of gridlock.” Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in the Schiavo Controversy,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 505, 519 (2005).
See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 372.
The legislative power is checked through popular election of legislators. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1; Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing Congress as “the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will”); J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 310 (1979) (explaining that that elections are the best sanction for
assuring representative behavior). It is also checked by bicameralism and the
presidential veto power. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
On the wisdom of life tenure for federal judges, see, for example, 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428–29 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
Delegation to administrative agencies is often defended on the ground that agencies are as accountable to the public as legislators because the President, who
appoints the agency officials exercising rulemaking authority, is elected. See
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices resolving the competing interest which Congress itself inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in the light of everyday realities.”). See
generally Richard Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Re-

2012]

WATCHING THE HEN HOUSE

77

Judges, as a group, are unrepresentative of the population.17 They
are insulated from much of the “real world.”18 Unlike executivebranch agencies that must follow the rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA),19 judicial rulemaking is
rarely subject to meaningful notice and comment.20 As a result, only a
few, if any, interests are heard prior to rule adoption. Often the only
interests heard from will be from partisan, organized groups within
the judicial system, such as law-enforcement agencies or prosecutors’
offices.21 Even if citizen organizations become involved, those organizations have the resources to intervene in only a small fraction of all
matters that affect their constituencies and likely would not address
matters of importance to other citizens.22 In this way, rather than
reducing the power of factions by playing them off against one another, judicial rulemaking typically accentuates the power of factions
because its processes render judge-rulemakers dependent upon a combination of vested special interest groups and recently graduated law
clerks for information and input.23 In sum, judicial rulemaking lacks

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

sponse To Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (arguing that courts are
institutionally incompetent to create and apply a workable delegation doctrine).
Of course, such an argument cannot be made on behalf of Article III judges.
See Michael McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 105 (1988). They are all lawyers and, on average, are
older, richer, whiter, and more male than the general population of the United
States. See id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (requiring agencies to follow
adjudicatory procedures whenever Congress requires a hearing on the record); 5
U.S.C. § 554(a) (requiring an agency to follow the APA’s rulemaking procedures
unless a limited set of exceptions apply). Congress enacted the APA as a “working compromise, in which broad delegations of discretion were tolerated as long
as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards.” Richard B. Stewart &
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1248 (1982).
See infra section III.B.
“[P]rocedure and the rulemaking process have become intensely political as special interest groups lobby rulemakers, seeking to tilt the litigation playing field
for strategic advantage.” Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure: the Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 984 (2009). Interest groups actively lobby advisory committees during the rulemaking process in favor of their preferred outcomes. See Paul
J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking
Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 120 n.50 (2010).
One of the stated purposes of the CJRA, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101–105, 104
Stat. 5089–98 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)) (commanding local
rulemaking advisory groups to formulate civil-justice-expense-and-delay reduction plans by the end of 1993), according to its legislative history, was to achieve
justice from the “bottom up,” from the “users” of the system. See S. REP. NO.
101-416, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6817.
See generally Russell R. Wheeler, Broadening Participation in the Courts
Through Rule-Making and Administration, 62 JUDICATURE 280 (1979) (arguing
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all of the structural features upon which the framers relied to protect
against factions.24 In addition, judicial rulemaking can be used to
defy or dilute the substantive policy preferences of the legislative and
executive branches.25 Unlike when it reviews rulemaking performed
by an administrative agency, Congress cannot always simply ratify or
overrule judicial rulemaking by statute or foster informed dialogue by
forcing the courts to articulate the basis for their rules, because not
every exercise of rulemaking authority by a court is an exercise of delegated power.26
that judicial rulemaking has become a vehicle through which a variety of interests groups may participate in court operations).
24. The scholarly literature has advanced arguments against judicial rulemaking,
including: judicial resistance to change; judges’ bias favoring their own preferences; judges being out of touch with the needs of litigants and members of the
bar; the perception that the legislature better reflects the public will; and concern
that judicial rulemaking will restrict or create substantive rights. See Bruce L.
Dean, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary’s Power to Promulgate
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 139, 149–50 (1988); see also Kenneth
S. Gallant, Judicial Rule Making, Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447 (1985) (criticizing the theory that
rulemaking can safely be entrusted to courts without fear that they will invade
the legislative domain).
These concerns are all the more significant in light of the recent work of statistical analysis by Sunstein and Miles demonstrating that significant elements
of judging can be explained in terms of the jurist’s political world view, particularly since rulemaking is less likely than adjudication to turn on the specific facts
of one case. See Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193 (2009) (indicating that judicial outcomes are affected
by judges’ political orientations, but that such effect is moderated when judges of
differing political orientations sit together in panels).
This is not meant to suggest, naively, that legislatures and executive-branch
agencies are immune to special-interest pressure or always act deliberatively and
in the common good, see, e.g., Samaha, supra note 12, at 528 (documenting the
excessive congressional response to the controversy arising out of the Schiavo
case, Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s denial of two parents’ request for a temporary restraining order to reinsert their daughter’s feeding tube) and concluding that
“[t]here were probably few actors less likely to make a sound decision about the
merits of the case than the United States Congress”); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
at 129–30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that the public
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”), but
rather that the secretive and insulated procedures of judicial rulemaking may be
worse. Cf. Sotirios Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut
to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (1988) (arguing that the process of discovering
the truth “is nothing other than giving and exchanging reasons in an openminded and public-spirited way about what to believe and how to live”).
25. See Stancil, supra note 21, at 99.
26. See infra section III.A (discussing the various sources of judicial rulemaking authority); cf. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1935)
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Two centuries ago, Jeremy Bentham argued that almost everything wrong with procedure could be attributed to “Judge and Company.”27 In Bentham’s view, judicially created procedure, endemic to
the common law, was also its bane, and he attributed all procedural
evil to guild self-interest: Judges, former lawyers who consorted with
lawyers and who derived income from fees, had created a system benefiting only judges and lawyers. In other words, Bentham viewed procedural rules as professional featherbedding and feared that
procedural designers and procedural consumers were too closely
joined.28
The thesis of this Article is a simple one: Courts regularly engage
in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated,
obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and
preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been
conferred on a more sophisticated faction. Although this Article focuses on the concerns arising from judicial review of judicial rulemaking, it includes some observations as to why, as a matter of policy,
expansive judicial rulemaking authority itself is concerning. It, therefore, joins the extensive scholarly debate surrounding the relative fairness, competency, and efficiency of the respective branches of
government to promulgate procedural rules.
Part II describes the increasing prevalence of quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of
rulemaking authority to the courts in the past half century, the result
of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision
that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization
of the rules of procedure between and among local districts.
Part III outlines the rulemaking authority of the federal courts,
which emanates from the REA, the Federal Rules of Criminal and
Civil Procedure, the U.S. Constitution, and the “inherent-authority”
doctrine. It also traces the major limitations on this power: the prohibition against courts making rules affecting “substantive” matters, the
Case and Controversy Clause of Article III, and the notice and comment requirements of the REA and the Due Process Clause.
Part IV describes a case study in local judicial rulemaking: courtroom-security rules, which are generally promulgated without an op(“Every exertion of the police power, either by the legislature or by an administrative body, is an exercise of delegated power. Where it is by statute, the legislature has acted under power delegated to it through the Constitution. Where the
regulation is by an order of an administrative body, that body acts under a delegation from the legislature.”).
27. C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 54 (1997).
28. See id. at 9–10.
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portunity for public notice and comment. Part V describes the
problem(s) that this Article seeks to address: the frequent promulgation of local rules governing subject matters that are arguably beyond
the scope of judicial rulemaking authority, which are then reviewed by
the very courts that issued them in the first instance, and the claims
of actual bias, the appearance of partiality, or both that can result. It
argues that it is improper for a judge who participated in promulgating a local rule to sit in judgment over the validity of that rule when it
is challenged in a specific case after adoption because the process by
which many of these local court rules are issued gives rise to a structural conflict of interest in having any judge of the promulgating district review a challenge to the promulgation and enforcement thereof.
It also notes that there is little case law governing who has standing to
challenge court rules or the scope or standard of a court’s review of a
court-created rule.
Part VI concludes that, in enacting arguably substantive local
rules, federal courts are exercising powers constitutionally committed
to Congress and, in doing so, impeding sufficient independent review
of such exercises and creating a diffusion of rulemaking responsibility.
II. THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING29
Judicial rulemaking, whatever its source,30 dominated the scene
for most of the first century of the American judiciary, although state
and federal courts alike relied heavily on the English system for their
rules of practice and procedure.31 The court-created system was characterized by common law writs, forms of actions, fact pleadings, and
separate courts of law and equity and was criticized as being “cum29. For a description of the rulemaking process, see generally The Rule-Making
Function and the Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1958);
WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 1–35
(1981); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Reexamination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975); Albert B. Maris, Federal Procedural
Rulemaking: The Program of the Judicial Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772 (1961);
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 797–802, 830–43 (1991); Wheeler,
supra note 23.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See Robert G. Lawson, Modifying the Kentucky Rules of Evidence—A Separation
of Powers Issue, 88 KY. L.J. 525, 539–40 (2000). “The history of English practice
thus reveals a pattern of shared judicial-legislative regulation of practice and
procedure. Under this pattern, the primary rulemaking initiative rested with the
judiciary, subject to the superior general power of Parliament to control procedure as it saw fit.” Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 49 (1988); see
Pound, supra note 3; Charles Anthony Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under
the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 601 (1940).
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brous, dilatory, expensive, [and] ultra-formal.”32 Judges and lawyers
resisted change, and the judiciary sparingly exercised its early
rulemaking in pursuit of procedural reform.33
In the early part of the twentieth century, efforts were made to
reform the practice and procedure of federal courts. The end results
were the REA, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the beginning
of the modern era of judicial rulemaking.34
Substantial changes in the structure and personnel of rulemaking
have occurred in the sixty years since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated.35 Legislatures have responded by delegating to courts more and more authority over the field; most
prominently, “Congress has accorded to the federal judiciary primary
responsibility for its own effectiveness.”36 Over the past half century,
the judiciary has moved from its original role as arbiter of the ultimate fairness of proposed rules to that of initial drafters of the rules.37
Since the passage of the first REA in 1934,38 multiple additional layers of rulemaking have been added, and judicial participation in the
drafting process has dramatically increased.39 Judges have now replaced practicing attorneys as the dominant players in the rulemaking
process.40
During the same time period, the rulemaking process has moved
from a relatively flat process of proposal and promulgation to a multitiered system of consultation, review, and revision by multiple committees.41 The rulemaking process depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors—area-specific advisory committees, the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court—to develop, refine, and approve court
rules.42 The agendas for the semi-annual Judicial Conference meet32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

Pound, supra note 3, at 599.
See Lawson, supra note 31, at 540.
See id. at 541.
See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 229.
Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281, 324 (1989).
See id.
Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006)).
See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 232.
See id. at 237. No statute specifies the composition of the Rules Advisory Committee, but recent practice has seen a majority or near-majority of judges and a
judge as chair. See id. at 243. Seven out of thirteen members of the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, including the chair, are judges, comprising
more than half of the membership. See Koppel, supra note 21, at 1008. Eight of
the fifteen members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are judges. See id.
The Judicial Conference membership consists entirely of judges. See id.
See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 231.
See Stancil, supra note 21, at 72. In 1958, Congress enacted legislation transferring the major responsibility for the rulemaking function from the Supreme
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ings include a disparate miscellany of items, ranging from air conditioning in courthouses to the assignment of visiting judges to judicial
discipline.43 Article III judges control every veto gate in this rulemaking process unless Congress intervenes.44
In 1990, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act,45 an
omnibus bill that created ninety-four amateur rulemaking groups
throughout the federal judicial system.46 One result of this shift to a

43.
44.

45.

46.

Court to the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Act of July 11, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). The Conference was mandated to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of
the [federal] rules” and to recommend appropriate amendments in the rules. Id.
The Supreme Court retained its statutory authority to promulgate the rules, but
it would henceforth do so by acting on recommendations made by the Judicial
Conference. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2073. Following enactment of the 1958 legislation, the Judicial Conference established a Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and five advisory committees to amend or create the civil,
criminal, bankruptcy, appellate, and admiralty rules. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 6–7 (1958). The Standing Committee’s mission was to supervise
the rulemaking process for the Conference and to coordinate and approve the
work of the advisory committees. See id.; see also Maris, supra note 29, at 772
(explaining the authorization and role of the Standing Committee). Although
changes have been made in operating procedures, the rulemaking structure today, having been codified in the REA, “is essentially the same as that established
by the Judicial Conference following the 1958 legislation assigning it the central
role in drafting and monitoring the federal rules.” Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of
the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 & n.65 (1995). The
Standing Committee “supervises the rulemaking process and recommends to the
Conference such changes to the rules as it believes are necessary to maintain
consistency and promote the interest of justice.” Id. at 1664. Five advisory committees assist the Standing Committee, each of which is responsible for one set of
federal rules (civil, criminal, appellate, bankruptcy, or evidence). See id. “The
advisory committees conduct ongoing studies of the operation of their respective
rules, prepare appropriate amendments and new rules, draft explanatory committee notes, conduct hearings, and submit proposed changes through the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference.” Id. “On most occasions, the Court
has deferred to the Judicial Conference and has prescribed without change proposed rules amendments submitted by the Judicial Conference.” Id. at 1674.
See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 246.
See Stancil, supra note 21, at 99. “Their control is direct in the case of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference, and the Chief Justice, acting as the
chair of the Judicial Conference, appoints members of the Standing Committee
and the various advisory committees (many of whom are Article III judges themselves).” Id. For a list of the handful of congressional interventions in the judicial rulemaking process from 1973 to 1985, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 8–9 n.20
(1984) (House Committee Report accompanying a precursor bill to the 1988 statute amending the REA). Most involved changes to the Rules of Evidence. See
Stancil, supra note 21, at 78 n.36.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). See generally S.
REP. NO. 101-416, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852; H.R.
REP. NO. 101-732, at 11 (1990).
See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 376.
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multi-tiered system of rule promulgation has been a Balkanization of
the rules of procedure. Each of the ninety-four trial districts and
eleven federal circuits now has its own, separate set of local rules.47
In addition to the local advisory groups and the local district and circuit rules, the Federal Advisory Committees on Civil and Criminal
Rules remain in existence, continually drafting further revisions to
the general federal rules, a task that parallels the work of the local
advisory groups.48 These rules govern court access, shape the structure of lawsuits, and significantly influence the course of pretrial proceedings.49 There are now more than 5,000 local rules regulating civil
procedure alone, not including standing orders and other local procedural requirements.50
In addition to increasing in complexity, judicial rulemaking has
also become increasingly legislative in nature.51 “Federal procedural
47. See id. at 380. In 1984, the Judicial Conference authorized its Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure to study and treat the problems that the local
proliferation of rules causes. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1467 n.33. The following year, the Conference empowered the Reporter of the Committee to collect and
organize all the district court rules, as well as other judicial commands that operate like rules, into one source. See id. The Reporter was also instructed to design
a project to study the growing number of divergent local rules. This “Local Rules
Project” discovered that the ninety-four federal court districts had an aggregate
of almost 5,000 local rules, “not including many ‘sub-rules,’ standing orders and
standard operating procedures.” COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC., JUDICIAL
CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL
PRACTICE 1 (1989). See generally Subrin, supra note 10 (discussing the history
and current state of local rules and demonstrating that local rules may not be
consistent with the general federal rules of procedure). Cf. A. Leo Levin, Local
Rules As Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1991) (approving of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 83’s creation of “local laboratories” for new rules). As one commentator noted, “[t]he arguments for uniformity
are strong and obvious,” Robel, supra note 10, at 1449, but not the focus of this
Article.
48. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 381.
49. See id. at 381–82.
50. See JUDICIAL CONF. INFORM. ITEM: LOCAL DIST. COURT RULES PROJECT, in COMM.
ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC., JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., LOCAL RULES PROJECT, at 1 (1988).
51. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 21 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that the federal rules “operate on all
litigants, with the binding effect of law” and that “[t]he Court’s function in the
process of promulgation of the Rules today virtually amounts to the adoption of
legislation”); Bone, supra note 3, at 889 (“[C]ourt rulemaking has moved toward a
legislative model and away from the traditional model based on reasoned deliberation and expertise.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 849 (1993) (noting that the
rulemaking process has “come to resemble the legislative process,” which is “an
overtly political process”); cf. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4–7 (1988) (explaining that courts inevitably make law, not only as a
by-product of adjudication but also to enrich the body of legal rules).
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rulemaking has for the past fifty years been counter-majoritarian and
predicated on a model of expertise.”52
III. GOVERNING STANDARDS
Briefly summarized, the delegation doctrine dictates that Congress
may not delegate any legislative power to an administrative agency
that Article I of the U.S. Constitution assigns to the legislative process.53 Critics of the delegation doctrine have argued that, when
courts face petitions to review administrative lawmaking, they are inevitably tempted to make policy in the guise of judicial review.54
What if the issue is not one of Congress delegating a particular
rulemaking power, or courts reviewing that delegation by making
rules of their own, however, but rather of the courts seizing the
rulemaking power in the first instance?
A.

The Rulemaking Authority of Federal Courts

The United States Constitution was adopted without a provision
explicitly governing judicial rulemaking, but the Supreme Court “at
an early date by rule of court considered that . . . it had the power to
regulate its own procedure.”55 Article III merely vests the “judicial
Power” in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress
may “ordain and establish”56 and extends that power to a select list of
“Cases” and “Controversies.”57 Article III’s textual brevity, which provides little guidance as to the proper extent of judicial authority, poses
a distinct problem for courts deciding separation of powers cases that
involve the judiciary.58 Unlike Articles I59 and II, which extensively
52. Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 439. See Carrington, supra note
36, at 310 (“The Rules Enabling Act was avowedly anti-democratic in the sense
that it withdrew ‘procedural’ lawmaking from the political arena and made it the
activity of professional technicians.”) (describing the original version of the REA
and the philosophy of expertise that animated allocation of procedural rulemaking to the judicial branch).
53. See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1249–74 (1985) (developing a proposed test of
improper delegation).
54. See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 673–32 (2d ed. 1978) (acknowledging judicial overreaching in light of the
broad scope of judicial review); Richard Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 485 (1985) (discussing the impact of judges’ personal political philosophies on statutory interpretation); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1809–10 (1975) (analyzing the scope of judicial review as a
vehicle for judicial policymaking).
55. Riedl, supra note 31, at 601.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
58. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1316.
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delineate the powers of Congress and the Presidency, Article III
merely vests “judicial power” in the federal courts.60 Other than providing for life tenure and prohibiting salary diminution, Article III
does not indicate what comprises this judicial power.61
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
60. Section 1 of Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Many state constitutions, in contrast, specifically grant the judiciary the
power to regulate practice and procedure within the court system. See, ALASKA
CONST. art. IV, § 15 (requiring the courts to adopt rules); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5
(authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “procedural matters”); COLO.
CONST. art. VI, § 21 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “practice
and procedure”); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (granting the supreme court exclusive
power to “adopt rules for the practice and procedure in courts” but reserving for
the state legislature the power of review and disapproval); MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 18 (empowering Maryland courts to prescribe rules but reserving a power of
review and disapproval for the Maryland General Assembly); MO. CONST. art. V,
§ 5 (granting specific rulemaking authority to the courts and providing for no
express legislative oversight or restriction as to court rules); NEB. CONST. art. V,
§ 25 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “practice and procedure”);
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (empowering the Ohio courts to prescribe rules but
reserving for the state legislature a power of review and disapproval); PA. CONST.
art. V, § 10(C) (granting the courts “the power to prescribe the general rules governing, practice, procedure and the conduct of all counts” as long as they do not
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules of evidence); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 37 (requiring
the courts to adopt rules). See generally Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1991) (construing the Alaska courts’ rulemaking authority to be exclusive); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987) (construing the Arizona courts’
rulemaking authority to be exclusive); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 414
(N.J. 1950) (invalidating legislation that extended the time for appeal beyond
that permitted by court-made rules because the New Jersey Constitution vested
the exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure in the courts); In re
Pa. C. S. 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1978) (interpreting PA. CONST. art. V,
§ 10(C)); White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 103 (Wyo. 1984) (invalidating a statute
regulating pleading in medical-malpractice cases because the Wyoming Constitution vested the exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure in the
courts).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and
The Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return To Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 668, 684 (1990) (discussing the Framers’ concern for guaranteeing the personal independence of judges). Presumably, enabling legislation is unnecessary
and the inherent-powers would be redundant in these states.
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The Supreme Court has recognized three general sources of judicial rulemaking power. First, Article III defines the exercise of judicial power to include deciding “cases” and “controversies.” Second, the
Court recognizes that Article I gives Congress limited power to delegate to the judiciary powers beyond the Article III powers, so long as
the delegation does not threaten “an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of
the United States,”62 assign “tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches,”63 or otherwise “impermissibly threaten[ ]
the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”64 Third, the Court
maintains that federal courts have “inherent” authority to exercise
certain nonadjudicatory powers.65
The authority of the United States District Courts to adopt and
promulgate local rules emanates from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5766 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which the Supreme
Court adopted pursuant to its authority under the REA and which
authorize the creation of local rules. Congress also vested federal district and circuit courts with the independent authority to prescribe
local rules of practice consistent with Acts of Congress and the rules of
practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court.67
62. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (upholding Congress’s grant of jurisdiction over common law counterclaims to the CFTC).
See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) (describing the
test for permissible Congressional delegation as whether the delegated practice
“‘prevents the Executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions’”) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977));
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 683–84 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality
of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act’s independent-counsel provisions).
63. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680–81.
64. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46–49 (1991) (discussing the
inherent power to sanction litigants for bad faith conduct); Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (discussing the inherent power of the courts to initiate contempt proceedings and to appoint counsel to
prosecute them); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (discussing the inherent
power of the courts to suspend or disbar attorneys).
66. Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may, after
giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make
and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule must be consistent
with—but not duplicative of—federal statutes and rules adopted under
28 U.S.C. § 2072 and must conform to any uniform numbering system
prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their
business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under [the REA].”).
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The REA and the Federal Rules of Procedure

Congress, through the REA, has delegated to the Supreme Court
the authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts.68 The REA enables the judiciary to promulgate federal
rules of practice and procedure, as long as those rules do “not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”69 In delegating its authority, Congress imposed an obligation on the Court to report its actions
and fixed a deferred effective date for adopted rules to allow for congressional disapproval, if desired.70 The result is that the REA embodies the constitutional separation of powers limitations on the
respective allocation of rulemaking authority between Congress and
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). The first section of the REA provides that “the
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.” Id.
The REA was not Congress’s first delegation of rule-promulgation power to
the courts. It was merely the codification at the federal level of a long series of
statutory delegations of procedural rulemaking authority to the courts. See JACK
B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 55–63 (1977) (providing a historical overview of rulemaking authority); Levin & Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 3–5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (providing rulemaking authority for local
rules of court). See generally The Rule-Making Function and The Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957) (containing statements of various judges addressing a congressional proposal to authorize the Judicial
Conference to make recommendations for revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Burbank, REA, supra note 3 (providing a history of the REA); Maris,
supra note 29 (discussing the history of judicial rulemaking and the Judicial Conference). Once the Constitution was ratified, Congress empowered the federal
courts to adopt rules for practice and procedure. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 stated that the circuit courts, as well as other federal courts, had the
authority “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting
business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of
the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2071). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of independent federal procedural rules was hampered
by the Process Acts of 1789, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (1789),
and 1792, Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792), and the Conformity Act of 1872, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872), which
required federal courts to follow state procedures in actions at law. See WEINSTEIN, supra, at 64–66. The undesirability of this arrangement ultimately led to
the twentieth century reform movement for a uniform set of federal procedural
rules, which culminated in the enactment of the REA in 1934, which granted the
Supreme Court the power to make “general rules of practice and procedure.” Act
of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072). See WEINSTEIN, supra, at 66–69.
The original REA spoke of only two layers of rulemaking: the Supreme Court,
which promulgated the Rules, and Congress, which could override a Rule. See
Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)–(b).
70. See § 2074.
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the courts.71 The first provision of the REA was “a delegation of some
federal law-making power created by Article III, which authorizes
Congress to establish lower federal courts.”72 In other words, “[t]he
Rules Enabling Act is just that: a statute that ‘enables’ the Supreme
Court to exercise its inherent procedural rulemaking function.”73 Perhaps as a result, besides authorizing general rulemaking authority,
the Act provides few details.74 It does not require a particular
rulemaking process or state what the new procedural rules should
do.75
The statutory limitations allocate the substantive rulemaking
power to the legislative branch, and the procedural rulemaking power
to the courts.76 However difficult this distinction between substantive
and procedural has proven in theory and application,77 it nonetheless
has been the conceptual paradigm for defining each branch’s rulemaking authority.78 The language of the REA and the cases construing it
have always recognized this division of rulemaking authority.79
Rule 57 only authorizes the district courts to adopt local rules that
are narrow in scope and regulate “matters of detail.”80 Both Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1329.
Carrington, supra note 36, at 287.
Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1334.
See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal
Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 274 (2009).
See id.
See U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 427.
See infra subsection III.A.3.
See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 429.
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–97 (1989) (holding that
Congress could constitute the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent agency and grant it the authority to bind federal judges to the sentencing ranges that it considered appropriate for various federal criminal offenses);
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Daily Income Fund, Inc.
v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 543–44 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 162–63 (1973); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112–14
(1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433–35 (1956); Miss. Pub’g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
10, 14 (1941) (explaining that the REA “was purposely restricted in its operation
to matters of pleading and court practice and procedure”).
See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 17 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that the district court’s adoption of a rule constraining the issuance of
subpoenas seeking client-related information from lawyers fell outside the permissible scope of rulemaking authority because it went beyond “matters of detail”
appropriate for local rulemaking and worked a fundamental procedural change);
Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of Penn., 975 F.2d 102, 107 (3d Cir.
1992) (holding that the adoption and enforcement against federal prosecutors of a
local rule that required prior judicial approval before service of a grand jury subpoena on an attorney in a criminal proceeding fell outside the rulemaking authority of the federal district court because it went beyond “matters of detail”
appropriate for local rulemaking).
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limit the scope of local rules promulgated under either authority to
rules concerning “practice.” Court-created rules are not supposed to
create or affect substantive rights.81 If a court, in fashioning a rule,
alters substantive rights by promulgating rules of general effect, it engages in unconstitutional lawmaking.82 “Local rules that fail to comply with those requirements are nullities.”83 In keeping with these
principles, in Frazier v. Heebe, the Supreme Court struck down a local
rule that it deemed “unnecessary and irrational.”84
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 authorizes a majority of district judges to adopt, make, and amend local rules governing its practice. Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 authorizes district
courts to promulgate local rules that are “not inconsistent” with the
Federal Rules. Section 2071 of the REA specifically forbids the promulgation of local rules “other than under this section.”85 The purpose of this exclusivity clause was to avoid the promulgation of the
equivalent of local rules under various other rubrics, such as “standing orders.”86
2.

Inherent Rulemaking Authority

The Supreme Court has, at times, recognized that the federal
courts have certain inherent rulemaking powers, arising from the nature of the judicial process, to control their internal process and the

81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) (permitting the local regulation of practice only when it is done in a manner “consistent with federal law”);
Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 651–52 (1960) (holding that a local admiralty rule
authorizing oral discovery depositions exceeded the district court’s rulemaking
authority and reasoning that the rule, “though concededly ‘procedural,’ may be of
as great importance to litigants as many a ‘substantive’ doctrine,” and was therefore too basic to be effectuated through local rulemaking). The second provision
of the REA dictates that the rules that the court-created rules that it authorizes
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” § 2072(b). This provision of the REA codified the repeated provision in predecessor statutes that
prohibited courts from promulgating any procedural rules that “were repugnant
to the laws of the United States.” Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 7, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
82. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1328.
83. Baylson, 975 F.2d at 107; see Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 646 (1986).
84. See Frazier, 482 U.S. at 646.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(f) (2006).
86. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1468.
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conduct of litigation.87 The Supreme Court has defined these “inherent powers” as those necessary for a court to function.88
The inherent-authority theory posits that, once Congress creates
federal courts and vests them with jurisdiction, it must also vest them
with those powers necessary for them to administer justice89 and to
87. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). While the existence of
inherent executive power is well established, see, e.g., United States v. CurtissWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (stating that the unenumerated
power of the federal government over foreign affairs rests principally with the
President), that of inherent judicial power is much less so. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1320. Nonetheless, the concept that
courts have certain powers directly resulting from their mere existence is not
new. In 1928, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained: “[C]ertain powers have
been conceded to courts, because they are courts. Such powers have been conceded, because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact
their business, nor accomplish the purpose of their existence.” State v. Cannon,
221 N.W. 603, 603 (Wis. 1928).
Whether this inherent power to promulgate rules exists has been described as
a “purely academic” issue. Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1021 n.19. Most commentators at least agree that “courts possess a certain measure of inherent rulemaking power.” Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 626 (1957). See
Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1116 (agreeing with the basic theory of inherent
rulemaking authority, but noting that “arguments [for the power] often reflect[ ]
the passion of the reformer more than the detachment of the scholar”); Levin &
Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 3 (conceding the existence of “an alleged inherent
power to engage in rule-making”). Scholars do not agree, however, about the nature of the power, compare Wigmore, supra note 3, at 276 (arguing that rulemaking is so essential to the judicial power that it preempts the field and renders all
legislative encroachment improper and unconstitutional), with Benjamin Kaplan
& Warren J. Greene, The Legislature’s Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 251 (1951) (observing that
“Wigmore’s omnibus argument is better taken as the jeu d’esprit of a master than
as a serious constitutional analysis”), and Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at
3, or its scope, see, e.g., Joiner & Miller, supra, at 626.
Scholars generally divide these powers into negative and affirmative ones.
See, e.g., STUMPF, supra note 3. The inherent negative power of the courts is their
power to invalidate legislative intrusions into their rulemaking realm. See Wolf,
supra note 6, at 518. The inherent affirmative power of the courts is the power to
engage in judicial rulemaking. A great deal of scholarly literature has been devoted to the former, but it is the latter of these two types of powers that tends to
be more controversial, see Wolf, supra note 6, at 521, and with which this Article
is concerned.
88. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1320; cf. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979) (defining a court’s inherent powers as those that were necessary to exercise its jurisdiction, administer
justice, and preserve its independence and integrity). The Texas Supreme Court
explained: “The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative
grant or specific constitutional provisions, but from the very fact that the court
has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities.” Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398.
89. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying Article III as the
constitutional source of the Court’s power to protect “the integrity of its proceed-
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preserve their status as part of an independent branch.90 Federal
courts have thus recognized a variety of powers as inherent, including
the powers to control their own proceedings and dockets;91 punish
contempts;92 impose sanctions on litigants;93 provide for process

90.

91.

92.

93.

ings”); Joiner & Miller, supra note 87, at 630 (arguing that courts have inherent,
and supreme, authority to prescribe rules “for the establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient administration of judicial business”); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 30.
See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1321. For the most
part, this asserted inherent authority is consistent with a vision of separated
powers that recognizes the courts’ need to be able to protect the integrity of their
processes without undue reliance on the political branches. See, e.g., Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (“The ability to
punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that
the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches.”).
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (“The District Court has broad
discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own
docket.”); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); United States v.
Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1098 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d
738, 740 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
See Young, 481 U.S. at 795–96; Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St.
P., M., & O. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) (explaining that “the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and
is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law”);
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) (“That the power to punish
for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be
regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The
courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become possessed of the power.”); Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254
(Tex. 1980) (holding that courts had the inherent power to punish a party for
refusing to obey a court order); see generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924)
(finding no constitutional impediment when Congress confers contempt powers to
courts). The power of contempt is vital to the judiciary in maintaining order,
controlling the courtroom, and enforcing orders and final judgments. Therefore,
other branches of government cannot pass regulations dictating to judges when
and how to exercise their contempt powers. See Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d
1357 (Ill. 1997).
See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (holding that federal
courts possessed the inherent power to issue attorney fee sanctions beyond that
conferred by statute or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11). For discussions of the
Court’s reliance on an inherent-powers theory in recognizing this authority, see
generally Rebecca G. Moore, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.—Judicial Discipline
Wields a Big Stick, 37 LOY. L. REV. 1043 (1992); Bryan P. Vezey, A Federal Court
Has Inherent Power To Assess Attorney Fees as a Sanction for Bad-Faith Conduct,
and in a Diversity Case May Employ that Power Without Regard to the Law of the
Forum State: Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), 33 S. TEX. L.
REV. 647 (1992).
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where none exists;94 “impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates;”95 “control admission to [their] bar[s] and to discipline attorneys who appear before
[them];”96 “vacate [their] own judgment[s] upon proof that a fraud has
been perpetrated upon the court;”97 “bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial;”98 “dismiss an action on grounds of
forum non conveniens;”99 “act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure
to prosecute;”100 consolidate cases;101 appoint auditors;102 and promulgate internal procedural rules for the conduct of litigation in the
federal courts.103
94. See Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 934 (Md. 1981) (quoting State v.
Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603–04 (Wis. 1928)).
95. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 227
(1821)).
96. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Colo. Supreme Court et al., 988 F. Supp. 1368 (D.
Colo. 1998) (noting that courts have the inherent power to discipline lawyers licensed by it or practicing before them).
97. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.
98. Id.
99. Id. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–09 (1947) (holding that
the district court possessed the inherent authority to dismiss a suit on the ground
of forum non conveniens), partially superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
1, 62 Stat. 869, 937 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006)).
100. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31
(1962).
101. See Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1876) (acknowledging the court’s inherent
power to consolidate actions arising out of single controversy).
102. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (holding that the district court
had the inherent power to appoint an auditor to assist in performance of its judicial duties).
103. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1297. Congress endorsed this inherent power in the REA, by statutorily conferring authority on the
federal courts to promulgate procedural rules. See id. Even scholars who argue
for concurrent roles for the judiciary and the legislature in the area of procedural
rulemaking recognize that there are certain powers and functions which must
remain within the ultimate control of the court:
[T]here is a third realm of judicial activity, neither substantive nor adjective law, a realm of “proceedings which are so vital to the efficient
functioning of a court as to be beyond legislative power.” This is the area
of minimum functional integrity of the courts, “what is essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal
and from the very fact that it is a court.”
Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 31–32 (internal citations omitted).
Regarding the conduct of judges, see, for example, Weinstock v. Holden, 995
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1999) (determining that a statute governing the disqualification
of judges violated the separation of powers provisions of the Missouri Constitution); In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1975) (holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had the inherent authority to adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct,
including a specific rule requiring the filing of annual financial statements). Regarding the conduct of attorneys, see, e.g., In re Edwards, 266 P. 665 (Idaho 1928)
(holding that the Idaho Supreme Court had the inherent power to adopt rules
and regulations prescribing the qualifications of persons seeking to practice law);
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There are “two primary theoretical basis for inherent judicial powers. The first is the separation-of-powers doctrine. The second is the
power inherent in a court because of its sheer existence.”104 The theories are not mutually exclusive, however, and courts have utilized
both doctrines in upholding the judiciary’s exercise of a particular inherent power.105
Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has upheld
the authority of district courts to promulgate local rules as long as (1)
they do not conflict with an Act of Congress; (2) they do not conflict
with the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court; (3)
they are not constitutionally infirm; and (4) the subject matter governed by the rule is within the power of the district court to regulate.106 Although the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to
create inferior courts and confer on them jurisdiction, once created,
these courts have the inherent power to promulgate rules of practice
and procedure not in contravention of substantive law.107 In other
words, the inherent power of the courts, once called into existence by
Article III, includes the powers to protect themselves, to administer
justice, to promulgate rules for practice, and to provide process where
none exists.108 Thus, the judicial power permits the exercise of legislative-like authority if it is ancillary to existing judicial powers.109

104.
105.
106.

107.
108.
109.

Turner v. Ky. Bar Ass’n., 980 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1998) (holding that a statute authorizing nonlawyers to represent parties in workers’-compensation proceedings
violated the constitutional principles of separation of powers); Belmont v. Bd. of
Law Exam’rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1974) (holding that the judicial branch had
the inherent power to prescribe and administer rules for licensing and admitting
lawyers); Peter F. Ruben, Illinois Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Authority Exclusive at Last, 83 Ill. B.J. 410 (1995).
STUMPF, supra note 3, at 6.
See, e.g., State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974).
See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 654, (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159–60, 162–64 (1964); Miner v. Atlass, 363
U.S. 641, 651–52, (1960); Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359, 368 (1839)). Consistent with these principles, Stumpf has recognized that trial courts are uniformly
found to have inherent powers “so that the adjudicative process can function”
where rules and statutes are silent. See STUMPF, supra note 3, at 37.
See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1334.
See id. at 1297.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (upholding judicial power to define what constitutes a “restraint of trade”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 45
(1825) (holding that Congress could properly delegate to the courts the power to
prescribe the method in which officers execute judgments)); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984)
(arguing that the courts’ power to make procedural rules is ancillary to Article
III, analogous to the ancillary authority of the President under Article II).
Courts’ inherent powers are not necessarily exclusive. Although some functions
are within the core powers of the judicial branch upon which other branches may

94

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:72

The focus of most separation of powers cases has been on judicial
independence as to decision-making rather than determining which
powers are necessarily part of the court system.110 What is clear is
that the local rule making authority of federal courts is supposed to be
limited.111 Courts usually rely on specific statutory authority, rather
than their “inherent powers,” for rulemaking out of a desire not to create unnecessary antagonism and confrontation with legislatures.112
This traditional judicial restraint has also reflected the superior ability of legislatures to gather information within certain areas.113
3.

Defining “Procedural”

“Procedure is substance.”114
Congressional rulemaking control has always been premised on
concerns about the allocation of federal powers, and, in particular, on
a concern that the legislature, not the courts, should engage in “policy
choices with a predictable and identifiable impact on rights claimed
under substantive law.”115 By statute, federal procedural rules are
initiated by the judicial branch,116 subject to congressional approval,

110.

111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

116.

not intrude, see Barland v. Eau Claire County, 575 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Wis. 1998)
(discussing the judiciary’s exclusive authority over supervision of judicial assistants), the vast majority fall in the great borderland of shared authority between
the courts and legislatures. See id. In many situations, the power of legislatures
and the courts overlap. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 517. Thus, the Court’s implied
rulemaking authority, although generally recognized, is subservient to that of
Congress unless the Court is exercising its rulemaking power in defense of judicial authority or integrity. See Beale, supra, at 1472; Robel, supra note 10, at
1480.
See Wolf, supra note 6, at 525; see, e.g., French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437,
448–53 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article III establishes three safeguards of judicial independence: (1) tenure of office; (2) protection against financial penalties; and (3) the rule (an implication of establishing a
“judicial power”) that final judgment must be carried out).
See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1994); cf. Sibbach, 312 U.S.
at 9–10 (emphasizing that court rules are adopted under a limited congressional
grant of legislative power).
See Wolf, supra note 6, at 523. This avoidance is particularly important in the
federal system, where there has been a long-standing recognition that Congress
has the power to prescribe rules of practice for the federal courts. See Hanna v.
Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 19.
See Wolf, supra note 6, at 529.
Stancil, supra note 21, at 71.
Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012,
1019–20 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Hold the Corks]. See Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 3, at 13–14 (arguing that courts are likely to impinge upon substantive rights in exercising rulemaking powers, “not because judges would make
rules governing substantive law as such, but rather because procedure and substance are inextricably interwoven”).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2073 (2006).
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which can occur by way of inaction.117 The now-familiar statutory allocation of power between Congress and the courts relies on the distinction between substance and procedure,118 and disputes about the
proper scope of judicial rulemaking have traditionally centered on discerning which matters are “substantive” and which are
“procedural.”119
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). Pursuant to the 1988 REA amendments, rules proposed by the Court under § 2072 or § 2073 go into effect unless Congress acts to
prevent their implementation within seven months after the Chief Justice reports the proposed rules to Congress. See § 2074(a).
118. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1473; see also Joiner & Miller, supra note 87, at 634
(“It is fundamental that court rules cannot . . . abrogate or modify substantive
law.”); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 14 (“Nothing could be clearer than
the fact that courts in the exercise of the rule-making power have no competence
to promulgate rules governing substantive law.”).
119. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1973); Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433
n.5 (1956); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946); Sibbach
v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 7–14 (1941). Almost immediately after enactment of the
REA, the Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and set the stage for
the first of its most influential opinions on the meaning of the words “practice and
procedure.” Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1. Sibbach filed a diversity-jurisdiction personalinjury action in federal court. The district court ordered him to submit to a physical examination, as authorized by a newly adopted federal rule, but he refused,
contending that adoption of the examination rule exceeded the Supreme Court’s
authority under the REA because it abridged his substantive rights. The Court
rejected this contention, upheld the examination rule, and provided the following
definition of procedure: “The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.” Id. at 14.
The Court rendered its opinion in Sibbach only three years after its landmark
decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court ostensibly rendered Sibbach as a decision on the rulemaking authority of the judiciary, but it
subsequently became entangled in the choice-of-laws issues produced by Erie, in
which the substance/procedure distinction is also important. See Lawson, supra
note 3. For more than two decades, lower courts struggled with the relationship
between the two decisions and with questions about the applicability in diversity
cases of federal rules of procedure that contradicted provisions of state law. See,
e.g., Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); Occidental Life Ins.
Co. of Cal. v. Kielhorn, 98 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1951); Jeub v. B/G Foods,
Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942); Bohn v. Am. Exp. Lines, 42 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). The Supreme Court rendered a series of unsettling decisions on
these subjects, see, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, before issuing its watershed opinion in Hanna, 380 U.S. 460.
Hanna was also a personal-injury case filed in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. The complaint filed by Plummer, the executor of the decedent’s estate, was served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provide for delivery of process to a defendant’s residence, but not under a provision of the corresponding state limitations statute, which required personal service upon the defendant. See id. at 461. The district court concluded that state
law governed service of process and granted summary judgment for Hanna, and
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Of course, the devil with judicial rulemaking is in the detail of the
distinction between procedural and substantive rules (the former
courts being permitted to promulgate, the latter being forbidden).120
Procedural rules almost inevitably influence the determination of substantive rights.121 The problem in determining what is procedural
versus substantive renders the process of identifying that part of the
procedural functions that are inherent in the judiciary extremely difficult, and commentators have argued that procedural rulemaking, by
necessity, also affects the substantive rights of the parties.122 The
classification of rules as either substantive or procedural is difficult
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, describing the
rules governing service of process as a “substantive rather than a procedural matter” and concluding that Erie dictated that the state statute governed the issue.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463. The question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether “service of process [in a diversity case] shall be made in the
manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. The Court concluded that the
Federal Rules controlled the service of process and reversed. See Hanna, 380
U.S. at 463–64.
The Court, for the first time, drew a sharp line between the two issues that
had coalesced in earlier opinions: the authority of the Court to adopt rules of
procedure and the obligation of federal courts to apply state law in diversity
cases. The first, a separation of powers problem, was governed by the REA; the
second, a federalism problem, was governed by Erie and its progeny. See Hanna,
380 U.S. at 471. More importantly for the purpose of this Article, with regard to
court rulemaking powers, the Court reaffirmed its Sibbach definition of “procedure” and clarified the means by which to measure rules that may have both
substantive and procedural components:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system . . . carries with
it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading
in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id. at 472.
Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring opinion that this test, which he
characterized as “arguably procedural,” was overly generous in its description of
judicial rulemaking authority and did little to ease the difficulty of distinguishing
between “substance” and “procedure.” Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Court has since attempted to qualify its position by clarifying that court-adopted
rules may have an “incidental” effect on substantive rights without exceeding the
rulemaking authority delegated by the REA. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods,
480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987); see also Carrington, supra note 36, at 299 (“Implied in Burlington Northern is a constraint on rules of court affecting substantive rights in
ways that are more than ‘incidental.’ ”).
120. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability,
and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L. J. 909, 1006–07 (2007); Burbank, Hold the
Corks, supra note 115; Carrington, supra note 36, at 301.
121. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 55; Bone, supra note 3, at 954 (conceding that
“there is no clear normative divide between procedure and substance”); Robel,
supra note 10, at 1477–78.
122. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 520, 524. The need for legislative review in these cases
arises from the fact that these procedures are so intimately related with substan-
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partly because substance and procedure are almost inextricably intertwined and partly because the two concepts remain imprecisely defined even after decades of doctrinal development.123 As a result, the
task of differentiating the substantive from the procedural has been
an elusive one for many courts.124
The difficulty that courts have had in defining what is procedural
has thwarted a uniform interpretation of inherent procedural powtive considerations that inherent in them is the potential of frustrating legislative policies. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 18.
123. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 551.
124. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 527. For example, during the Congressional hearings
on the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, former Supreme Court Justice
Goldberg testified that the law of evidence is more substantive than procedural
and falls within the domain of the legislature. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 73, 142–46 (1973) (testimony of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg).
On the other hand, Judge Maris, who had been involved in the formulation of the
rules, testified that the lawyers, judges, and scholars who had worked on the
rules were “fully satisfied that rules of evidence are . . . basically procedural,
and . . . within the rule-making power of the Court.” Id. at 76 (statement of Albert B. Maris). Legal scholars have written extensively on this substance-versusprocedure problem. See, e.g., Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1187–88 (“Everybody knows that ‘procedure’ and ‘substance’ are elusive words that must be approached in context, and that there can be no one, indeed any, bright line to mark
off their respective preserves.”); Carrington, supra note 36, at 297–98 (characterizing Hanna’s “arguably procedural” test as a “false step” that had “led us off the
trail with respect to the Court’s power to enact . . . law based on the broad penumbra of the substance-procedure distinction”); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J.
1781, 1781, 1797 (1994) (placing the substance/procedure boundary between
rules “designed to affect conduct outside the courtroom” and rules designed “to
enhance the accuracy of the fact finding process”); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Charles Joiner, Uniform Rules of
Evidence for Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 434 (1957) (arguing that court rules
must “regulate the method of proving cases” and implicate “no other policy . . . involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of judicial business”);
Joiner & Miller, supra note 87, at 629–30 (characterizing the procedure/substance distinction as “a twilight zone of indefinition” and proposing a standard for
distinguishing between the two); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 15
(describing the task of precisely locating the line between substance and procedure as “well-nigh impossible”); Edmund M. Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 468 (1957) (proposing that “rules which
determine the legal relations between the parties when all the facts are known or
assumed are rules of substance”); Riedl, supra note 31, at 604 (arguing that “because of carelessness in the use of the terms . . . it is now impossible to determine
what is meant by the terms ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural law.’ ”); Olin Guy
Welborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in
the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 404 (1977) (suggesting, in the context of
the rules of evidence, that “a rule is substantive . . . (a) if it has a nonprocedural
purpose, or (b) even if its purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to
affect behavior at the planning as distinguished from the disputative stage of
activity”).
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ers.125 Of course, the inability to reach a consensus concerning what
is procedural complicates the broader issue of which procedural powers are inherent to the courts. Ultimately, the substance/procedure
divide that defines the outer limits of judicial rulemaking authority
devolves into “a policy question where a series of arguments . . . must
be weighed and balanced.”126
4.

Cases and Controversies

Article III of the United States Constitution gives the courts the
power to pronounce the law only in a particular case or controversy.
That power is “not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject
to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”127 “Beyond this [the judicial power] does not extend, and unless it is asserted
in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the
power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.”128
The inherent powers of federal courts are strictly tied to their adjudicative functions.129 While courts’ authority is not limited solely to
adjudication, but includes certain ancillary functions incidental to the
adjudicatory role, such as rulemaking and judicial administration that
are essential if the courts are to carry out their constitutional mandate,130 the courts “cannot make substantive rules by any means
other than writing opinions in ‘cases or controversies,’ without taking
leave of [their] role as defined by Article III.”131
Rulemaking is neither “part of the case adjudication process” nor
“ancillary” to that process.132 Thus, to use the REA to make substantive policy would violate Article III.133 “[W]hen the Supreme Court
makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important
respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or any federal court,
is engaged when it makes federal common law.”134 If substance and
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Wolf, supra note 6, at 527.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 54.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995).
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
See Wolf, supra note 6, at 518.
See O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972).
Carrington, supra note 36, at 287. Judge Weinstein has argued that the ban on
advisory opinions also might vitiate judicial rulemaking authority because
rulemaking authority represents a similar infringement on legislative power. See
WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 44–55.
132. See REDISH, supra note 51, at 21.
133. See Carrington, supra note 36, at 287.
134. Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 115, at 1021. Burbank elaborates upon this
reading of the REA in Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,
700–10 (1988).
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procedure are mutually exclusive,135 designating the procedural function of the REA in the first sentence excludes any ability to make substantive rules. Therefore, by shielding substantive rights from
abridgment and modification, the REA expresses constitutional principles that derive from the case and controversy limitation of Article
III.136
Unlike state courts, federal courts are not common law courts.137
This distinction is important because the tradition that the details of
legal procedure “for the most part of Anglo-American legal history had
been left to rules of court”138 is a common law one.139
B.

Statutory and Due Process Requirements of Notice and
Comment

The REA contemplates that committees of the Judicial Conference
will propose rule changes to the Conference and that these proposals
will be transmitted to the Supreme Court and then, if approved, to
Congress.140 Pursuant to two provisions added in 1988 with the intent to open the rulemaking process to public scrutiny,141 the REA
requires committees charged with rulemaking responsibility to hold
their meetings in public—after public notice—to ensure that proposed
rules are subject to comment before transmission.142
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(a) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83 implement the statutory proscriptions of § 2071 of the
REA. Section 2071 authorizes district courts “to prescript rules for the
conduct of their business . . . only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment.”143 Rule 57 authorizes a majority of district judges to adopt, make, and amend local rules governing
135. See supra subsection III.A.3.
136. See Carrington, supra note 36, at 287. Carrington also argues that the REA’s
supersession clause confirms the constitutional allocation of lawmaking and
rulemaking authority to the legislative and judicial branches, respectively. See
id. at 322–26.
137. See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 697 n.9 (4th Cir. 1982).
138. Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV.
28, 35 (1952).
139. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 525–26.
140. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006).
141. The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 shortened 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 and added §§ 2073–2074. See Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4648–50 (1988).
142. See U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1)–(2). The other changes that the 1988 legislation imposed
repeated the emphasis on openness and accountability in the rulemaking process.
Congress repealed the former REA and replaced it with separate sections, U.S.C.
§§ 2072–2074, which were designed to open national rulemaking to public scrutiny and to give Congress a longer time period during which it could interrupt the
rulemaking process. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1468.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)–(b) (2006).
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its practice only “after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment.”144
The statute requires advance notice of advisory committee meetings, written minutes, and explanatory and dissenting statements regarding proposed rule revisions, as well as an opportunity for the
public to attend committee meetings. It does not, however, incorporate an opportunity to be heard,145 a traditional hallmark of procedural due process.146 The result is that, unlike in the context of
administrative rulemaking, stakeholders in the judicial rulemaking
process lack hearing and appeal rights.
Any court rule affecting a deprivation of property or liberty should
trigger, at a minimum, the core procedural due process requirements
of reasonable predeprivation notice to parties in interest and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.147 While the Advisory Committees,
Standing Committees, and Judicial Conference148 responsible in the
first instance for the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Civil Procedure, and Criminal Procedure follow these procedural requirements, district courts often do not follow them during the promulgation of their local rules and general orders, and, despite the
relatively straightforward requirements laid out in the REA, there is
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1).
145. See U.S.C. § 2073.
146. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339–42 (1969); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).
147. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002); LaChance v. Erickson,
522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570
n.2 (1972); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 431
F.2d 643, 657 (9th Cir. 2005).
148. The United States Judicial Conference is made up of the Chief Justice and chief
judges from each of the thirteen courts of appeal, the Chief Judge of the Court of
International Trade, and twelve district judges chosen from each circuit by the
judges of that circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006); A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the
Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 687 (1995) [hereinafter Self-Study].
District judges are selected by the circuit and district judges within their circuit
and serve terms of three-to-five years. See U.S.C. § 331. Among other things, the
Judicial Conference is tasked with reviewing the business of the federal courts,
including review of rules of practice and procedure. See id. The Conference
meets twice a year to “consider the administrative problems and policy issues
affecting the federal judiciary and to make recommendations to Congress concerning legislation affecting the federal judicial system.” Self-Study, supra, at
687. It is expressly authorized to propose rules to the Supreme Court, but, as a
practical matter, its proposals are nearly always vetted through the Standing
Committee and the relevant advisory committee before transmission to the Supreme Court. Stancil, supra note 21, at 77 n.25. To date, it has empanelled advisory committees in connection with the rules of Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy,
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. Id. at 77 n.26.

2012]

WATCHING THE HEN HOUSE

101

little case law addressing when district courts must engage in notice
and comment rulemaking in the promulgation of their local rules.
One of the few cases addressing the issue is United States v. Terry.149
In Terry, a single district judge had issued a general order regarding
the procedures for filing declarations in support of certain criminal
motions.150 Terry filed a criminal motion in violation of that general
order, but asserted that he had no notice (actual or constructive) of the
order.151 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the general order in question was subject to the notice and
comment provisions of Rule 57.152 The court held:
While we do not doubt the district court’s power to regulate its practice in
criminal cases in a manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Local Rules, we find the notice of G.O. 384 was inadequate. In
Wardlow, we held that the district court properly denied a request for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence because Wardlow forfeited
his right to an evidentiary hearing by not properly submitting a declaration
pursuant to a local rule. However, Wardlow is distinguishable in that, in this
case, the court relied on a General Order of which neither the defendant nor
his attorney had notice. We recognize that, in promulgating local rules, a district court has “considerable latitude” in calibrating its public notice method
to the individual needs of its jurisdiction. However, G.O. 384, which was used
as a basis to deny Terry an evidentiary hearing, is a one-judge order posted on
the courthouse bulletin board and published in a local legal newspaper. Terry
and his attorney received no actual notice of G.O. 384. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress without allowing
Terry an opportunity to present evidence.153

Terry appears at least to require some procedural due process protections when a district court promulgates a general order that concerns
practice requirements.
In Truesdale v. Moore,154 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to an order adopted by its
Judicial Council. That order, which governed death-penalty representation within the circuit, had several purposes, one of which was challenged in Truesdale:
Order No. 113 imposes on district courts and the circuit court a timetable for
deciding petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 by defendants
who are under sentence of death. District courts are instructed to render a
decision and enter final judgment within 180 days of the date on which the
petition is filed, subject to an extension of up to thirty days if the court determines that justice so requires. The court of appeals is directed to render a
decision within 120 days of the date on which petitioner’s reply brief is filed.
The court of appeals is also to rule on any petition for rehearing or suggestion
for rehearing en banc within thirty days of the date the petition or suggestion
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

11 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
142 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 1998).
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is filed or the date a response thereto is filed, whichever is later. And if rehearing is granted, any hearing must be conducted and a final decision rendered within 120 days of the entry of the order granting rehearing. If a case is
not timely decided the Circuit Executive may seek an explanation of the reasons why the court has not complied with the time limitations. One reasonable explanation, for example, would be that a court needed to hold a case for a
critical decision of the Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit.155

Truesdale argued that the Judicial Council of the Fourth Circuit had
violated 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1), which contains a notice and comment
provision similar to that contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. Specifically,
§ 332(d)(1) requires that any rule or order “relating to practice and
procedure shall be made or amended only after giving appropriate
public notice and opportunity for comment.”156 The Truesdale court
rejected the argument that Order No. 113 was invalid for failing to
comply with the notice and comment requirement, reasoning:
In drafting and considering Order No. 113, the Judicial Council addressed a
simple, internal problem: the delay within the Fourth Circuit in cases involving collateral review of capital sentences. The Council selected an internal
solution to that problem and determined that no public notice and comment
period were necessary. Order No. 113 imposes requirements on judges and
courts within the Fourth Circuit. The order is not addressed to litigants or
litigators, the usual focus of procedural rules. Nothing in the order alters any
briefing or other deadlines placed on counsel. Nothing creates a right in any
party to enforce the court’s internal deadlines. Thus Order No. 113 is not a
rule of practice or procedure for which notice and comment are required.157

Truesdale, therefore, distinguished between purely internal, administrative rules and rules that “impact” upon litigants or litigators.
IV. CASE STUDY: COURTROOM SECURITY
On February 15, 2006, the judges of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California (Eastern District) adopted
General Order 441, which required, in pertinent part: “At initial appearances, all defendants will be fully shackled.”158 General Order
441 was issued after having been adopted by an unidentified majority
of the judges in the Eastern District.159 The order was signed by
Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District, David F.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 758.
28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (2006).
Truesdale, 142 F.3d. at 760.
General Order No. 411 at 2, United States v. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 1:06-CR-00131 OWW). The judges of the Eastern District
promulgated General Order 441 in light of and in putative compliance with
United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing and vacating the district court’s order upholding the district-wide shackling policy of the
United States Magistrate Court for the Central District of California). See
United States v. Evans, No. 1:06-CR-00051 OWW 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062,
at *35 (E. D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2006).
159. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062, at *14.
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Levi, “for the Court.” The order defined “fully shackled” as “leg
shackles, waist chains, and handcuffs.”160 In support of the policy, the
judges of the Eastern District found that: (1) the United States Marshal for the Eastern District “recommend[ed] full shackling of all detained defendants at all proceedings in order to assure the safety of all
persons in the courtroom, including the judge, lawyers, interpreters,
court personnel, defendants, and the public”; (2) the Eastern District
“ha[d] a heavy criminal caseload” that required “the movement of
many detained prisoners in and out of the courtroom”; (3) “[m]ost
criminal proceedings are brief such that the time in which a defendant
[wa]s before the court fully shackled [wa]s minimal”; and (4) the alternatives to full shackling were not practical, would require greater
numbers of deputy marshals with no significant increase in decorum
or dignity for the defendant in a district in which the “resources of the
Marshal service” were “finite” and “[u]nshackling all defendants for
all proceedings would cause very considerable delays and would disrupt the operation . . . of the calendar court [and] potentially of all
other courtrooms . . . to provide additional deputies necessary to assure security when defendants [we]re unshackled.”161 Attached to
General Order 441 was an “Open Letter to the Courts [of] the Eastern
District of California” regarding “Restraint Issues concern[ing] prisoners in U.S. Courts” from Antonio C. Amador, United States Marshal,
reflecting the belief of the United States Marshals Service (USMS)
that “it [wa]s in the best interest to maintain the highest level of detainee security: such as, the uniform use of full restraints during all
pretrial proceedings.”162 General Order 441 did not provide for any
individualized determinations regarding the appropriateness of full
body shackling.163
General Order 441 was not adopted pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking.164 It was promulgated without a public hearing or
any hearing at which sworn testimony or other evidence was taken or
subject to cross-examination, without an opportunity for the affected
parties to offer counter-evidence, and without any other meaningful
review of the asserted rationality of the USMS policy, solely on the
basis of the “open letter” to the judges from Marshal Amador, who was
neither under oath nor subject to confrontation by an adverse party,
which would not itself have been admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence.165 Instead, prior to its adoption, representatives of the
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5.
See United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009).
Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062, at *22.
Federal Rule of Evidence 101 dictates that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States and before the United States magistrate judges, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. Rule
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local Federal Defender’s Office and the local United States Attorney’s
Office met with one magistrate judge and representatives of the local
USMS, which ended in “an impasse on the [shackling] issue.”166 At no
time did any affected pretrial arrestee have the opportunity to address
the “evidence” offered by USMS or to offer additional evidence prior to
the adoption of the policy.167
The Eastern District is not alone in using local rules, general orders, or both to issue regulations relating to courtroom security.
Courts have used general orders, for instance, to authorize maximum
security measures in high-publicity cases.168
1101 dictates that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply generally to criminal cases
and proceedings, with the exception of a few specifically delineated miscellaneous
proceedings. Rule 102 dictates that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed to secure, inter alia, fairness in administration ascertainment of truth,
and the just determination of proceedings.
166. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062, at *22–23.
167. The subsequent rule-based history of shackling in the Eastern District is tortured. On a consolidated appeal by several defendants from the magistrates’
shackling orders their cases, a judge of the Eastern District concluded that General Order No. 441 had not been promulgated with the appropriate public notice
and comment rulemaking procedure. See id. at *56–57. He referred the General
Order to all of the judges of the Eastern District for repromulgation. See Brandau, 578 F.3d at 1066. The Eastern District judges then issued General Order
No. 449, adopting Local Rule Criminal 43-401, which set out a “new” shackling
policy for initial appearances in the Sacramento and Fresno courthouses, and directing a period of public notice and comment. Id. The judges then vacated that
Order and adopted modified rules twice more. Id. The present rule, announced
in the second modification, General Order No. 465, applies only to the Sacramento courthouse and requires that “[u]nless the Court determines otherwise, at
the commencement of initial appearances, all in custody defendants shall be in
leg restraints (including waist chains).” Id. (alteration in original). The rule is
different from General Order No. 441 in certain key respects: the present rule
allows for the possibility of individualized determinations, applies only to in-custody defendants, and establishes a general practice of leg and waist shackling but
not of handcuffing. Id. The new rule, however, does not apply to the courthouses
in Fresno and Yosemite National Park. Id. General Order No. 465 was accompanied by written findings, which noted “the exclusion of the Fresno division from
this policy” and explained that “each judge in that division is responsible for, and
committed to the safety and decorum of the proceedings, and makes shackling
decisions on individual cases in consultation with counsel, parties and the United
States Marshal.” Id. at 1066–67. The findings further explain that General Order No. 465 does not apply at all to the courthouse in Yosemite “because of the
type of facilities at [that] location[ ], and because the security in [that] location[ ]
is provided by federal agencies other than the Marshal Service and whose primary functions do not include courtroom security.” Id. at 1067 (alteration in
original).
168. See United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 526 (8th Cir. 1977) (reviewing a general order authorizing “the presence of five plain clothes United States Marshals
in the courtroom, the posting of several Marshals outside the front doors of the
courtroom and the use of an electronic metal detecting device on all spectators
entering the courtroom”). See also United States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing a local court rule requiring that all exhibits be
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V. THE PROBLEM
A local rule must be constitutional and rational, and its subject
matter must be within the ambit of the court’s regulatory power.169
For separation of powers purposes, the REA codifies Congress’s legislative power to enact substantive laws and the federal judiciary’s judicial power to enact rules of practice and procedure for proceedings in
its courts.170
Unfortunately, many courts have erroneously viewed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as a charter for local court procedural independence, causing one commentator to note that the goal of uniformity
“has often been honored in the breach in practice in the federal trial
districts.”171 Restricting the use of local rules was one of the purposes
of the 1988 amendments to the REA.172 The amendments “set forth
procedural requirements for courts to follow in adopting rules and provide an oversight mechanism to ensure their consistency with each
other and with national rules.”173 Nonetheless, challenging local
rules presents its own difficulties, particularly with the mechanisms
presently available.174
With regard to the shackling case study, on the one hand, the oversight of persons who are part of the judicial process has generally been
accepted to be within the realm of judicial control,175 and the control
of courtroom procedures is generally considered to be within the exclusive control of the courts.176 Courts have thus determined that they
have the inherent power to adopt rules of conduct for judges, lawyers,
and other court personnel.177 Some courts have gone so far as to say

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.
176.

177.

placed within the custody of the clerk for security reasons, except for weapons
and other sensitive material).
See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 640, 645–46 (1986).
See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1333.
Robel, supra note 10, at 1447 n.3.
McCabe, supra note 42, at 1688.
Id.
See Levin, supra note 47, at 1576 (arguing that the traditional mechanisms are
“inadequate”); David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537, 553 (1985) (“The impact of the rules on individual
litigants is usually too glancing to warrant appeal, and so they remain
unchallenged.”).
See Wolf, supra note 6, at 531.
See, e.g., State v. LaFrance, 471 A.2d 340, 344–46 (N.H. 1983) (holding that a
statute authorizing law-enforcement officials to wear firearms inside courtrooms
was an unconstitutional violation of the principles of separation of powers because trial judges had the exclusive, inherent power to control courtroom
proceedings).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ inherent powers to
regulate judges and attorneys). Regarding the regulation of court personnel besides judges and attorneys, see, for example, L.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm’n, 744
A.2d 798 (Pa. 2000) (determining that it was a violation of the constitutional
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that the judiciary has the inherent power to control all practice and
procedure within the courtroom.178 On the other hand, defendants
are not judicial personnel. Statutes of limitation and speedy-trial
rules are generally enacted by legislatures,179 and legislative time
limits for post-trial proceedings have been upheld as constitutional
under the separation of powers doctrine.180
In sum, it is not clear how far the inherent judicial rulemaking
powers extend or whether, for example, they authorize the Eastern
District to promulgate its court security rules as local rules. It appears that the adoption of some of these court security rules may exceed the rulemaking authority over those “matters of detail”
contemplated by the federal rules of procedure, and these rules are
often promulgated without prior notice and an opportunity for all affected parties to be heard.181 Local rules regarding the in-court
shackling of defendants involve (or should involve) weighing a number
of substantive policy considerations involving litigants and litigators
as they appear in court, communicate, and conduct business concerning their rights and liberty and the demeanor, decorum, and appearance of fairness in the administration of criminal justice. While one
would hope that the judges’ rulemaking decisions would reflect the
various constituencies who use the courts, there is presently no requirement that they do so, and it is highly questionable whether local
judicial rulemaking functions should include choosing between competing, and compelling, public values. The lack of the basic procedural
protections of notice and comment rulemaking and the scope of the
matters that these rules govern ought to render these local rules nullities and void for lack of due process,182 requiring a reviewing court to

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

principle of separation of powers for the state ethics commission to discipline a
probation officer); State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 454 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1994)
(holding that the judiciary had the inherent authority to control the conduct of
bailiffs).
See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1358 (N.M. 1976).
See Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
See, e.g., Le v. State, 953 P.2d 52, 54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that the
legislature could define the scope of available post-conviction relief without violating the separation of powers provisions of the U.S. Constitution).
United States v. Evans, No. 1:06-CR-00051 OWW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062,
at *22 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2006) (“General Orders are, as a general rule, promulgated without any notice and comment procedure.”).
See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1974); Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267
(1970); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Hawaii’s
system for classifying and treating sex offenders violated Neal’s right to “minimum due process protections” because it resulted in his being labeled a “sex offender” when he never had prior notice and “an opportunity to formally challenge
the imposition of the ‘sex offender’ label in an adversarial setting”). “When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 (footnote omitted). Notice must be “reasonably
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order them rescinded.183 Of course, these rules are standing orders
applicable in all cases; they are not the result of individual adjudications and so do not fall under the courts’ jurisdiction to resolve cases
and controversies. On the contrary, they were promulgated in a way
that avoided challenge in an individual case. In other words, a good
argument could be made that these court-made regulations are more
than merely procedural rulemaking, since they do not directly affect a
core function of courts,184 but rather affect the substantive rights of
the parties.
There is already a body of scholarly literature critiquing the promulgation of local rules on the ground that they pose a threat to the
goal of uniform, simple rules of federal practice, particularly when
they are inconsistent with the national rules185 or that they involve
subject matter that is not appropriate for judicial rulemaking.186 After all, it is well-known that “substance” often gets packaged as “procedure,” in what commentators have described as “substantive
considerations secreted in procedural interstices.”187 The problem
that this Article addresses is a different one, essentially one of venue
and standing: To whom does a litigant make the argument that a
court-made rule is inappropriate, either in substance or procedure,
and which litigants can? These questions are particularly acute in the
case of courtroom security rules, since judges are not only the makers
of the rules, but also their primary intended beneficiary. Nonetheless,
cases and commentary are almost entirely devoid of answers to these
questions.

183.
184.

185.

186.

187.

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
Cf. Guenther v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a
party’s due process rights would be infringed if they were “unfairly prejudiced” by
ex parte communication).
The core functions of courts have been defined as: “(1) protection of constitutional
rights; (2) determination of controversies between parties, including construing
constitutional and statutory provisions; and (3) enforcement of final judgments.”
Wolf, supra note 6, at 534.
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422 (1985), at 14–15; CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 431–32 (5th ed. 1994); Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local
Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62, 62 (1989); John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2059, 2060 (1989); Subrin, supra note 10, at 2018–26. But see Steven Flanders,
Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information?,
14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 216 (1981) (arguing that local courts’ rulemaking has
been “well-reasoned and beneficial”).
See Robert N. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study
on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV. 15, 52 (1977)
(arguing that some rule amendments have pushed “the rulemaking process into
controversial, uncharted areas of law and thus have been affecting the rights of
litigants in a fashion more likely to create the kind of pressure from the public
and the legal profession that generates congressional response”).
Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 19.
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Judicial Legislation Subject to Judicial Review

One of the problems with the statutory and constitutional allocation of rulemaking authority to the courts is that it is enforced by the
judicial-review process, which is supposed to ensure that the rulemaking allocation is not transgressed when the courts exercise their
rulemaking power.188 Unlike administrative rulemaking,189 however, judicial rulemaking is not subject to judicial review—at least not
in the APA sense.190
An even more fundamental problem is that, to the extent that
court-made rules are reviewed, they are reviewed by the same courts
that have promulgated them in the first place.191 Procedurally, the
present system permits local rules regulating practice to be both
adopted and reviewed by local judges, at least at the first instance, in
their own courts. In other words, if a litigant challenges a local dis188. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1330.
189. The APA governs judicial review of administrative agency actions generally.
Once primary authority for a matter has been placed in agency hands, the judicial role becomes one of oversight, and § 706(2) of the APA sets the general standards for performing that role. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006):
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
190. See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 481 (1993) (arguing for a limit on the discretion of the
judicial rules committees to be accomplished through a set of administrativeagency-like guidelines).
191. See Coleman, supra note 74, at 287 n.167 (“[I]n thinking of judicial review, it
would be odd for the Court to review its own originally drafted rules and amendments.”); Yeazell, supra note 3, at 250–51 (noting that one advantage to taking
judges out of the rulemaking process would be that the Supreme Court could
more legitimately give the rules “judicial review” because it would no longer hesitate to act for or against a rule because of the pressure that comes with the rule
having been created by its “brethren”).
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trict court rule as being beyond the scope of the court’s power to promulgate, a judge on that same court would ordinarily review that
challenge. The Supreme Court has the ultimate responsibility of deciding whether a rule, on its face or as applied, violates the REA and
its prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”192 As other commentators have noted, however, the
Supreme Court has never held any Rule to violate the REA.193
Substantively, rulemaking also involves policy decisions. The current system permits these policy decisions to be made in the first instance and presumably reviewed in the second by unelected federal
judges. In other words, courts are tasked with determining whether
their own rules are the result of reasoned decision making. The result
is that this judicial review of judicial rulemaking entirely removes
both the substance and the procedure of the rules being promulgated
(i.e., “justice”) from the domain of politics and the public discussion.194
This self-review problem is then compounded by the doctrine of precedent, which complicates error correction at a later stage of review.195
As one commentator has explained: “Constitutional democracy is
based in no small part on the insistence that no one can be trusted
with unrestrained power.”196

192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
193. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 477–78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Yeazell, supra note 3, at 246.
194. This is not to suggest that Congress has no power to engage in its own review of
court-promulgated rules, see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437
(2000) (“Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.”), although the scope of that power is the subject of a great deal of
scholarly debate. For the purpose of this Article, it suffices to say that, historically, Congress has not exercised its powers of review and intervention over court
rules often, see Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1018 (describing the “long-enduring pattern of congressional acquiescence” to rules adopted by the Court), and it
is impractical to expect that it would do so in the context of any objectionable
local district court rule, particularly one that does involve a high-profile issue.
See Pound, supra note 3, at 602 (“Legislatures today are so busy, the pressure of
work is so heavy, the demands of legislation in matters of state finance, of economic and social legislation, and of provision for the needs of a new urban and
industrial society are so multifarious, that it is idle to expect legislatures to take
a real interest in anything so remote from newspaper interest, so technical, and
so recondite as legal procedure.”).
195. See McConnell, supra note 17, at 105–06. In this context, the practice of following precedent can have drawbacks, if it prevents courts from adjusting rules to
meet new conditions. The relative advantages and disadvantages of a doctrine of
precedent, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
196. Id. at 91.
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Bias, the Appearance of Partiality, and Recusal

As other commentators have noted, when judges rather than lawyers frame the rules of court, they open themselves to the perception
of partiality, in light of their self-interest in the substantive outcome
of such rules.197 Frederick Schauer has argued, in the context of adjudicatory rules, that the courts’ need to resolve concrete disputes generates cognitive biases that distort judicial development of legal
rules.198 These concerns are even more prescient in the context of
codified rule promulgation, which is not bound by precedent199 or ana197. Yeazell, supra note 3, at 240; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences,
Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627, 631–32
(1994) (arguing that the possibility that judges seek to maximize self-interest is
“particularly valid in the context of a discussion about procedural rules” because
they are “promulgated under the direction of judges”). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (disputing many of Macey’s contentions about judicial selfinterest).
198. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
199. By “bound by precedent,” this Article refers to the practice of conforming current
decisions to rules established in prior cases. On the subject of precedent, see generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 132–56 (2001) (noting the problem of cognitive
bias, evaluating natural, rule, and result models of precedent, and adopting a
model that “instructs the present judge to discover and conform to the intentions
of past judges, who occupy for this purpose the position of Lex”); EISENBERG,
supra note 51, at 50–76 (analyzing the ways courts determine the meaning of
precedent and what it means to be bound by precedent); K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 64–69 (1960) (discussing the “twoheaded” nature of precedent); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 183–89 (1979)
(describing the practice of “distinguishing” precedent); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 181–87 (1991) (analyzing the relationship between reasoning from rules and reasoning from precedent); Larry Alexander, Constrained
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (evaluating natural, rule, and result
models of precedent and advocating a rule model of precedent); Barbara Baum
Levenbook, The Meaning of a Precedent, 6 LEGAL THEORY 185 app. at 233–38
(2000) (discussing coherence theories of precedent meaning); Robert S. Summers,
Precedent in the United States (New York State), in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 355, 378–94, 401–04 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (introducing a case study of the role of precedent in New York).
Whether courts are, in fact, constrained by precedent rules is a subject of
much debate. See SCHAUER, supra, at 185–87 (discussing precedent rules implicit
in judicial opinions); Frederick Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82
IOWA L REV. 911, 916–18 (1997) (suggesting that rules need not be canonical in
order to be determinate). Most notably, legal realists are known for their skepticism about the ability of rules to constrain decisionmaking. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN,
supra, at 66–69 (discussing the malleability of precedent rules); see also Brian
Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50–53 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson
eds., 2005) (identifying skepticism about the constraint of rules as part of the
legal realism school). For counterarguments in favor of the capacity of rules to
carry determinate meaning, see SCHAUER, supra, at 53–62 (defending a theory of
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logical reasoning.200 Judicial domination of court rulemaking
presents a significant risk of self-dealing because “judges face at least
some incentive to pursue rules that . . . may be contrary to congressional intent, but attractive to the judiciary for other reasons.”201 One
semantic autonomy); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity,
and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 568–70, 607–21 (1993) (defending certain
qualified understandings of the objectivity of law). This is not an issue that this
Article seeks to resolve. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices simply to say
that courts generally view themselves as bound to follow precedents in adjudication of disputes and, consequently, that they regularly study prior opinions in
search of applicable rules, and that this attention to precedent can help correct
bias at the time judges first consider and announce rules because judges who
believe that they must take precedent into account will feel obliged to review
prior opinions with care before deciding a case and preparing an explanatory
opinion. See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
925–26 (2006).
200. “Analogy is a method of decision when no precedent rule applies (or perhaps
when a judge wishes to avoid a seemingly applicable rule by narrowing its
scope).” Sherwin, supra note 199, at 927. The analogical practitioner studies an
array of intuitively related cases and “abduces” criteria that make them relevantly similar or different. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 925, 962–63 (1996) (describing the process of drawing an “analogy-warranting rule” from the facts of prior cases as “abduction”). The practitioner “then decides the case at hand in a manner that conforms to the outcomes of prior cases
classed as similar.” Sherwin, supra note 199, at 927. One effect of the practice of
analogical reasoning is to narrow the scope of judicial lawmaking. See id. at 929.
“The rules and reasons courts cite in support of analogies tend to operate at a low
level of generality.” Id. “Thus, the perceived obligation to draw analogies helps
to keep judicial lawmaking incremental. Of course, incremental rulemaking does
not in itself counteract situational biases; in fact, it may exacerbate the bias by
narrowing the scope of the court’s inquiry.” Id. But it can minimize the harm
done when bias distorts judicial reasoning. See SCHAUER, supra note 199, at 186
(noting that, even without authoritative precedent, judges who search for analogies remain constrained by the “existing linguistic and conceptual structure”).
For more on the subject of analogical reasoning, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN,
supra note 199, at 128–35 (assessing the advantages and disadvantages of analogical reasoning and concluding that it can only be justified on “second-best”
grounds); STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
27–41 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the three steps of analogical reasoning: identifying an authoritative precedent, assessing factual similarities and differences
from the precedent case, and judging whether the similarities or differences are
more important); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–6
(1949) (explaining that legal reasoning primarily consists of “reasoning by example” on a case-by-case basis); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 62–100 (1996) (arguing that courts are drawn to analogical reasoning
largely because analogies do not require completely theorized agreements); Larry
Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 80–86 (1996) (arguing that
analogical reasoning entrenches the erroneous outcomes of past decisions);
Brewer, supra, at 925–29, 962–63 (delineating a three-step model of analogical
reasoning and claiming that analogical reasoning can produce results with rational force).
201. Stancil, supra note 21, at 100.
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concern that has been expressed is that the result of this will be the
creation of procedural rules by insulated judges acting on their own
prejudices.202
This Article is concerned with a related but different question:
Whether it is improper for a judge who participated in promulgating a
local rule to sit in judgment over the validity of that rule when it is
challenged in a specific case after adoption. As Judge Weinstein has
noted: “One matter of some concern [is] the ability of any court to remain impartial in its consideration of a rule when an attack was made
upon the rule’s wisdom or constitutionality, since the same body that
promulgated the rule was passing upon it.”203
28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006) provides: “No judge shall hear or determine
an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”204 While
the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to construe § 47, it
has strictly construed its predecessor, the Judiciary Act of 1891. In
Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,205 the Court held:
The terms of the statute . . . are both direct and comprehensive. Its manifest
purpose is to require that the circuit court of appeals be composed in every
hearing of judges none of whom will be in the attitude of passing upon the
propriety, scope, or effect of any ruling of his own made in the progress of the
cause in the court of first instance, and to this end the disqualification is made
to arise, not only when the judge has tried or heard the whole cause in the
court below, but also when he has tried or heard any question therein which it
is the duty of the circuit court of appeals to consider and pass upon.206

In Moran v. Dillingham,207 the Court explained:
The intention of congress in enacting that no judge before whom “a cause
or question may have been tried or heard” in a district or circuit court, “shall
sit on the trial or hearing of such cause or question” in the circuit court of
appeals, manifestly, was to require that court to be constituted of judges uncommitted and uninfluenced by having expressed or formed an opinion in the
court of first instance. . . .
The enactment, alike by its language and by its purpose, is not restricted
to the case of a judge’s sitting on a direct appeal from his own decree upon a
202. WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 8–11, 54–55.
203. Id. at 8. See Charles W. Grau, Who Rules the Courts?: The Issue of Access to the
Rulemaking Process, 62 JUDICATURE 428, 430 (1979) (“The combination of
rulemaking and rule applying roles renders the deciding judges unable to impartially decide the validity of their own rules.”).
204. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.
1970) (Craven, J.) (disqualifying himself as a member of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the hearing and disposition of an appeal of
desegregation orders issued by the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina because, as a district judge in the same district, he had
heard and determined a case involving the same parties and ultimate question
relating to the sufficiency of the school board’s actions in complying with the constitutional requirements of desegregation).
205. 228 U.S. 339 (1913).
206. Id. at 343–44 (citations omitted).
207. 174 U.S. 153 (1899).
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whole cause, or upon a single question. . . . [A] judge who has once heard the
cause upon its merits in the court of first instance is certainly disqualified
from sitting in the circuit court of appeals on the hearing and decision of any
question in the same cause which involves in any degree matter upon which
he had occasion to pass in the lower court.208

28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where . . . the judge . . . has been a material witness concerning [the
matter in controversy];
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity has participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he . . . has . . . any . . . interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . .
....
(d) For the purposes of this section, . . . “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial,
appellate review, or other stages of litigation . . . .

“The statute imposes a self-enforcing duty on the judge.”209 Under
§ 455(a), a judge “does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced,
so long as he appears to be so.”210 Section 455 requires not only that
judges be subjectively confident of their ability to be even-handed, but
208. Id. at 156–57 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827).
209. United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 1980).
210. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). The “extrajudicial-source”
doctrine, which the Supreme Court explored in great detail in Liteky, finds its
origins in earlier recusal cases, including United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, (1966), which involved 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006) (requiring recusal of a
judge, upon motion, for bias or prejudice). Grinnell held that “[t]he alleged bias
and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.” Id. at 583. See United States v. $292,888.04
in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[r]ecusal is required ‘only if the bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial source and not
from conduct or rulings made during the course of proceedings.’ ” (quoting Pau v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991))).
Liteky applied the extrajudicial-source doctrine to § 455, but clarified that the
existence of an “extrajudicial source” was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal. The presence of an extrajudicial source is
not sufficient on its own, because “some opinions acquired outside the context of
judicial proceedings (for example, the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not warrant recusal.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554. Neither Litkey
nor any other case further distinguishes between the types of extrajudicial information that would demand recusal and those that would not.
The presence of information from an extrajudicial source is not a necessary
condition for recusal because bias could also exist “in the rarest of circumstances”
where no extrajudicial source is involved if the judge displayed “deep-seated and
unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 556.
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also that an informed, rational, objective observer would not doubt the
judges’ impartiality.211 That is true because § 455(a) concerns not
only fairness to individual litigants, but also the public’s confidence in
the federal judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is
allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted.212 “[T]he
test under either subsection (a) or (b) is the same, namely, whether or
not given all the facts of the case there are reasonable grounds for
finding that the judge could not try the case fairly, either because of
the appearance or the fact of bias or prejudice.”213
211. Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1994).
212. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988); see also
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that the right to trial by an
impartial judge “is a basic requirement of due process”); Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (explaining that the Court must guard against district
judges “sitting themselves in judgment upon misconduct of counsel where the
contempt charged is entangled with the judge’s personal feeling against the
lawyer”).
213. Conforte, 624 F.2d at 881. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that a federal judge hearing consolidated bankruptcy cases was
irreversibly tainted, warranting disqualification from some of the cases, by a
structural conflict of interest arising from the judge’s extensive ex parte discussions with two neutral advisors that covered all of the major issues in the consolidated cases, including one advisor’s drafting of legal opinions, and from extensive
and substantive ex parte meetings with the parties, which added to the appearance of partiality); Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
a federal district judge should have recused himself, sua sponte, from presiding
over the adjudication of a habeas corpus petition challenging a state-court trial
and conviction over which he presided in his former capacity as a state-court
judge); In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a special
master, who had been appointed in connection with underlying litigation relating
to mismanagement of Indian trust accounts, should have been recused from contempt proceedings brought against various government employees because the
special master’s tasks in the underlying litigation resulted in numerous ex parte
communications with witnesses and third parties, the special master’s tasks in
the contempt proceedings were adjudicative in nature, and the nature and extent
of the special master’s ex parte contacts would have caused an informed observer
reasonably to question his impartiality); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court clearly erred in appointing a Court
Monitor as a Special Master-Monitor where his numerous ex parte communications and his significant prior knowledge obtained as Court Monitor, on the basis
of which he had formed and expressed opinions of continuing relevance to the
litigation, cast doubt on his impartiality); Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir.
1996) (per curiam) (holding that a judge’s actions in meeting, ex parte, with a
panel of experts that he had appointed to investigate Illinois’s mental-health institutions and programs, in order to receive a preview of the panel’s conclusions,
was grounds for disqualification and that prohibiting opposing counsel from discovering what was said in the meetings resulted in unauthorized private investigation by the judge raising concerns about the judge’s impartiality); United
States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a district judge
could not adjudicate a case since, while serving as an Assistant United States
Attorney, he had been responsible for the investigation leading to the defendant’s
indictment); United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
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The common gravamen of the cases interpreting § 47 and § 455 is
that, when a court has been privy to ex parte communications and
deliberations that affected a prior decision, that court is disqualified
from ruling on the same issue(s) when it is raised in a subsequent
proceeding. This is because such a ruling would constitute a determination of “an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by” that
court, in violation of § 47, because the court’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” in the subsequent proceeding, in violation of
§ 455(a), or because the prior ex parte communication would imbue
the court with “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” render the court “a material witness concerning” the matter in controversy, or provide the court with an “interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the [subsequent]
proceeding,” in violation of § 455(b).
The process by which many of these local court rules are issued, as
well as the practice of courts reviewing the local rules that they have
issued, gives rise to a structural conflict of interest in having any district judge of the promulgating district review a challenge to the promulgation and enforcement thereof. The result of the typical judicial
rulemaking process is that each of the district judges possess two
types of extrajudicial information that warrant their recusal: (1)
knowledge of the procedural history of the promulgation of the local
rule; and (2) knowledge of the substantive necessity of the rule beyond
that set forth in the written record of adjudication.
Unfortunately, there is very little case law addressing this type of
extrajudicial-source bias in the context of the promulgation of local
court rules that are subsequently challenged. In a typical recusal
case, the recused judge was previously involved in the individualized
application of the law to a particular party. An analogous, although
not entirely parallel, situation to a district judge evaluating the legality of a local district rule would be if a legislator voted for a piece of
legislation and was then appointed to a court hearing challenges to
that the district judge was not required to recuse himself merely because he had
received a psychiatric report of a codefendant and had found the codefendant incompetent to stand trial). Edgar relied upon two additional cases that are informative: In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992) and
Hathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 & n.4
(4th Cir. 1995). The judge in School Asbestos Litigation had attended a partisan
workshop covering material that was the subject of a key merits issue in an ongoing case, 977 F.2d at 770, while the judge in Hathcock made a speech to a Trial
Lawyer’s Association seminar containing remarks that were “pointedly hostile
toward defendants” while a jury trial on the issue of damages was pending before
him. Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 39. Even though the seminar and the speech were not
directly connected with the ongoing litigation, the events were open to the public,
and evidence could be taken about the proceedings, they were still grounds for
mandatory recusal as they indicated the judges’ bias or inclination for or against
a particular party on substantive legal issues.
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the constitutionality of that same statute. The problem, however, is
that there is no case law squarely deciding that such former legislator
could not rule on the constitutionality of such legislation.
Nonetheless, many of the circumstances found problematic in
cases like Edgar v. K.L., In re Kensington, In re School Asbestos Litigation, and Hathcock v. Navistar are present in the context of judicial
review of judicially created rules.214 If nothing else, all of the judges
who participated in the promulgation of these rules were likely privy
to ex parte communications regarding their necessity. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that recusal
was warranted on appeal of the Eastern District’s court-promulgated
shackling policy:
On remand, the consolidated case—which challenges the constitutionality
of a rule promulgated by the judges of the Eastern District, as well as their
very authority to promulgate it—shall be assigned to an out-of-district judge.
Although we do not suggest that there is any actual bias on the part of the
judges, our ethics rules require recusal where a judge’s impartiality “might
reasonably be questioned.” Here, the circumstances surrounding adoption of
these orders suggest that an objective observer might reasonably question the
impartiality of the judges.215

What is noteworthy about the Ninth Circuit’s remand order in
Brandau, however, is not its analysis, which is insightful, but its
anomalousness. In finding that a judge of the district that promulgated a local rule could not adjudicate the constitutionality of that
rule, much less that all of the judges of the district should be treated
as parties in any subsequent proceedings, the Ninth Circuit cited no
apposite precedent, either controlling or persuasive, for its holding,
and the author of this Article could find none.
C.

Standing, Scope, and Standard of Review

In the context of administrative rulemaking, the Supreme Court
has clearly interpreted constitutional and statutory standing requirements, enabling a wide variety of stakeholders to seek judicial review
of agency rules.216 By contrast, there is little case law governing who
214. See supra, note 213 and accompanying text.
215. United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)). In remanding the case for further proceedings, the court of appeals suggested that the district judges who had promulgated
the local rule in question could “retain separate [from the United States Attorney’s Office] counsel to represent their interests at that proceeding” so that they
could “intervene in the proceedings” or “file an amicus brief.” Id.
216. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970)
(holding that a plaintiff could satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement by alleging that the “challenged action caused him injury in fact, economic
or otherwise” or by seeking to protect an interest that was “arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question”).
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has standing to challenge court rules—for example, what injury an
individual must suffer as a result of a judicially created rule to give
rise to a case or controversy that a reviewing court could decide. In
the Brandau case, the Government sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to
dismiss Brandau’s challenge to the shackling rule at issue on the
ground that he lacked standing to challenge it.217
The same lack of governing case law exists for the scope and standard of a court’s review of a court-created rule—for example, if a court
refused to adopt a rule, whether such action would be reviewable at all
and, if so, how much deference the reviewing court would be required
to give either to a court-created rule or to the lack thereof. In the context of administrative rulemaking, courts generally answer these
rules by interpreting the legislative intent of Congress in delegating
the rulemaking power in the first instance.218 Because the text of the
REA is silent on this issue and neither the legislative history nor the
statutory structure gives any suggestion of the answer to these questions,219 however, courts have not answered these questions in the
context of judicial rulemaking. While courts’ review of agency
rulemaking roughly follows the same general approach as they have
followed for judicial review of adjudication,220 they have not addressed the question of whether this framework should also apply to
the review of court-made rules or how much deference they should
give to the decisions of judicial rulemakers. The purpose of judicial
review of agency rules is to allow courts to determine whether they are
consistent with the legislative intent behind the statute enabling
them.221 The purpose of judicial review of judicial rules is unclear,
most importantly the question of how much deference a reviewing
court should give to a promulgating court’s rulemaking (particularly
when that promulgation might have been its own).
217. See Brandau, 378 F.3d at 1067–69.
218. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (announcing the two-part test for judicial review of administrative agency
rulemaking delegated by Congress through enabling statutes). When courts review agency adjudication, if Congress’s intent is clear, the issue is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947) (upholding judicial enforcement of an NLRB order requiring Packard to
bargain with a union); see also NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322
(1951) (finding that the definition of a “union” was a question of law reviewable
de novo by the courts). When Congress’s intent is unclear, the issue becomes a
mixed question of law and fact, and courts must defer to the agency’s decisionmaking. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
219. This is likely because the statute seeks largely to codify the vague mandate of
Article III and the inherent rulemaking powers that courts had at common law.
220. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L. J. 819, 858 (1988).
221. See id. at 864–65 (proposing that judicial review should be thought of as a way to
compensate for limitations in the performance of other branches of government).
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VI. CONCLUSION
When reorganizing government just before the Revolution, the predominant concern of Americans had been freeing legislative and judicial power
from executive control. The judiciary was not yet clearly conceptualized as a
distinct branch of government. Rather, the administration of justice was commonly conflated with the executive power. The power of adjudication implicated the Crown fully because colonial judges served at the King’s pleasure
and the Privy Council was the court of last resort for the colonists. When the
colonies turned to creating the first wave of new constitutions, their focus was
on curbing the magistracy and establishing the broad scope of legislative
power. Judges were freed from the power of the governor, but subjected in
substantial measure to legislative supervision.222

Historically, the Supreme Court has been more willing to assert its
inherent rulemaking authority in the context of the promulgation of
rules governing criminal, rather than civil, proceedings,223 asserting a
“supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts.”224 There is no reason for this greater willingness
in Article III, the REA, or logic.
222. Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional Requirements of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21,
27–28 (1998) (footnotes omitted). For a contrary position, see Agran v. Checker
Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. 1952) (“Prior to the adoption of the United
States Constitution, courts exercised complete power in the control of their own
procedure. . . . That system became modified in this country by the adoption of
statues, whereby the legislature usurped a part of this rulemaking function.”).
223. Robel, supra note 10, at 1478; see Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 382–83
(2003) (exercising inherent supervisory authority to establish a procedural rule
requiring a district court to notify a pro se litigant about the consequences of recharacterizing a prisoner’s post-trial motion as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus before doing so); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
878–79 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (urging the Court to exercise its inherent authority to impose a standard regarding the detention of deportable aliens
who are material witnesses in criminal cases); Rosales-Lopez v. United States,
451 U.S. 182, 190–92 (1981) (exercising inherent authority to establish a procedural rule requiring district courts to inquire into racial prejudice during voir dire
when there is a possibility that racial prejudice could influence the jury); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969) (exercising inherent authority
to establish a procedural rule entitling a defendant to vacate a guilty plea if the
district court accepted it in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11);
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 199 (1943) (exercising inherent authority
to prohibit comment on a criminal defendant’s refusal to testify). But see Thiel v.
S. Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (requiring, under the Court’s “power of
supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts,” that federal
civil juries be chosen from a cross-section of the community in order to preserve
the integrity of the federal courts’ processes).
224. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (asserting the power to supervise lower federal courts by devising procedures for them not otherwise required
by the Constitution or statute and ordering the suppression of McNabb’s confession in his federal murder trial because it resulted from a coercive delay in
presenting him before a magistrate judge after his arrest). Adjudicative supervisory authority and the authority to promulgate codified rules are, or should be,
distinct concepts. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme
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The framers saw the separation of powers as a protection of civil
rights. In arguing against amending the Constitution to include enumerated rights, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the Constitution without a bill of rights is “in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.”225 Under the separation of powers
doctrine, any regulation is permissible unless it is prohibited by
proper legal action. The Constitution authorizes the government to
regulate only in one way—“through a legislative process structured to
minimize prohibitions for factional purposes.”226
Judicial rulemaking sacrifices many of the protections of the full
legislative process, particularly the requirement of action by three distinct institutions. Rather than the typical separation of powers quesCourt, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006); Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due
Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1052–60 (2003) (arguing that the federal
courts’ rigid approach to stare decisis blurs the distinction between adjudication
and legislation by treating case holdings like generally applicable rules); Burbank, Procedure, Politics, supra note 6, at 1681 (insisting that the distinction “between procedure fashioned (or applied as precedent) in decisional law and that
provided prospectively in court rules” is critical in any discussion of the court’s
inherent power over rulemaking). Cf. A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and
Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 84–86 (A.W.B. Simpson
ed., 2d Series 1973) (explaining that “to express an authoritative opinion is not
the same thing as to legislate”). In reaching its holding in McNabb, the Court
conflated its supervisory authority and authority to promulgate codified rules,
reasoning that “[j]udicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.” McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340. On at least one
occasion, the Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged that it considers adjudication and rulemaking to be two means of accomplishing the same end. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) (citation omitted) (“[T]his Court, by
decision or under its rule-making power, can change or modify the [witness-competency rules] where circumstances or further experience dictates.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L.
REV. 221, 245 (1997) (noting that courts sometimes use “case-by-case adjudication to circumvent or preempt court rulemaking obstacles posed by the Enabling
Act process”). At the same time, the line between the Court’s supervisory-power
rulings and other cases is not always clear. Beale, supra note 109, at 1448 n.100.
It can be hard to identify the point at which the interpretation and application of
the law cross over into lawmaking, but there must be some difference between
the two if legislation and adjudication are to remain distinct. See Bradford R.
Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1289 (1996). For examples of post-McNabb cases in which the Supreme
Court has formulated rules of evidence or procedure for inferior federal courts
without explicitly invoking its “supervisory authority,” see Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957) (holding that a criminal action had to be dismissed when the Government failed to comply with a discovery-production order); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65 (1957) (finding prejudicial error in
the trial court’s denial of Roviaro’s request to compel the Government to disclose
the identity of an undercover informant).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
226. Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 381.
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tion of delegation, however, judicial rulemaking gives rise to the
opposite question of usurpation. Article III does not speak to the federal courts’ rulemaking authority, and the cases dealing with congressional delegations of power and modification of federal court
jurisdiction are largely unavailing in resolving the issue of judicial
usurpation of rulemaking power.227
In enacting substantive local rules, federal courts are exercising
powers constitutionally committed to Congress and thereby impeding
sufficient independent review of such exercises.228 The result is a diffusion of responsibility: “Because so many people and so many layers
are involved in rulemaking, in a broader sense, no one is in charge.”229
As Stephen Carter has aptly explained: “The entire point of a constitution that governs structure is to enable government to function while
restraining the ability of government to restructure itself.”230

227. There is a significant line of decisions dealing with problems of the scope of Article III case and controversy judicial power. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–76 (1982) (discussing judicial power in terms
of the types of cases and controversies the Framers assigned to an independent
Article III branch and the three situations where Article III does not bar creation
of legislative courts or delegations to administrative agencies). These cases typically involve an issue concerning congressional delegation to a legislative court or
administrative agency that allegedly transgresses the scope of Article III jurisdiction by conferring judicial powers on persons lacking Article III independence.
See id. at 64–70. In Northern Pipeline, for example, supporters of the Bankruptcy
Act argued that, since Article I empowered Congress to create legislative courts,
it could have thus “constituted” the bankruptcy courts as their equivalents. Id. at
63. The Court, however, rejected this assertion. It viewed situations allowing
Article III creation of legislative courts as “exceptional” and grounded in constitutional text or in historical consensus. Id. at 68–70. “The Court has never considered rulemaking authority per se to be an attribute of the judicial power under
Article III.” Robel, supra note 10, at 1481 n.221. These cases, therefore, provide
problematic analogies for construing judicial rulemaking beyond the scope of explicitly delegated powers, which does not create a legislative court nor delegate
power to an administrative agency.
228. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083,
1110–11 (1987) (suggesting that the Court focus on three inquiries in evaluating
separation of powers issues: whether one branch is exercising powers constitutionally committed to another, preventing another from performing its functions
or duties, or acting in a manner that prevents sufficient review or control by another, or both). “Of course, if Congress cares enough about a given procedural
change, it can always act directly to amend the relevant rules by statute.”
Stancil, supra note 21, at 128 n.167. This Article leaves for others the explanation of why relying on Congress to undo ill-advised court rules is an inadequate
remedy.
229. Yeazell, supra note 3, at 231.
230. Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 366 (1990).

